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FOREWORD
The Otterhein Miscellany is published once or twice a year as
an outlet for faculty writing on a wide variety of topics. The
college underwrites this publication in the belief that it will
help maintain a genuine community of scholars. Papers are
accepted, therefore, on the basis of their interest to the whole
academic community rather than to members of a particular
discipline. Editorial responsibility rests with a committee of the
faculty.
Contributions are considered from the Otterbein College
faculty and administration, active and emeritus — others on
invitation only.
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T- So Eliot once described the process ot writing as an “intol
erable wrestle/With words and meanings.’’ This process is
intolerable because it is never ending. “A poem,” said Valery,
“is never finished, only abandoned.” And, by extension, a prose
essay is never finished. The writer simply perfects it as he is
immediately capable, and then presents it to his readers, in
whose eyes it must live its own life.
The selections which comprise this edition of the Miscellany
afford a cross-section of much that is being thought and said by
members of the Otterbein community. Of the essays, three deal
with history, one with social change, one with nature, and one
with literature. Two of the selections are poems.
In choosing manuscripts for the Miscellany, the editors and
editorial board are governed by a principle that recalls Montaigne.
He wrote:
When I want to judge someone else, I ask him how far he is
pleased with his own work. I want none of these pretty
excuses: “I did it only as a pastime — it didn’t take me an
hour — Tve never looked at it since.” Well then, say I, put
it aside, and give me one which is indeed yourself — one
you are willing to be measured by.

Each of the following selections contains something of the writer
himself, something he is willing to be measured by. Each repre
sents the results of one person’s intolerable wrestle with words.
And all the selections are offered here for whatever pleasure and
knowledge the reader might derive from them.
We express our gratitude to Margie Shaw and Forest Moreland
for their efforts in the preparation and printing of this journal,
and to all those persons without whose support and assistance
this yearly venture would not be possible.
The Editor

.1

■ ;?

CONTENTS
Feudal Jurisprudence in the Encyclopedie ......................
Sylvia Vance

1

The Westerville Whiskey Wars ........................................ 21
Harold B. Hancock
The New Black Mood (comment and poem) ....................... 35
0. Amos
Concepts of Change: Cause and Response ..................... 37
James Winkates
A Village Life: Edith Wharton’s Summer ........................ 42
James R. Bailey
A Dream (poem) ............................................................ 50
Norman Chaney
Michelet: Romantic Historian of Joan of Arc ................... 51
Michael F. Rothgery
The Wonder of the World: A Theological Reflection ......... 55
Norman Chaney
Contributors .................................................................. 63

r

Sylvia Vance

FEUDAL JURISPRUDENCE IN THE ENCYCLOPhlE
^‘Far from being less modern than they knew, they [the
philosophes] were even more modern than they claimed.^’
— Peter Gay

Beginning in 1751 and continuing until 1765, the publication
of the seventeen volumes of the Encyclope'die ou Dictionnaire
raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers under the editor
ship of Diderot and (for a time) d’Alembert was a major eighteenth
century event. The desires of the philosophes to acquaint the
reading public with progress in philosophic, scientific and
technical knowledge had led to their undertaking this monumental
task in the firm Enlightenment belief that human understanding is
capable of comprehending the system of the world, and that the
popularizing of this knowledge will enable men to have a new
mastery of it — a mastery whose ramifications could improve the
lot of mankind in ways political, practical, ethical and esthetic.
As we peruse the thousands of pages today and sample the
entries, we realize that the titles of articles sometimes give
scant clue to the fascinating turns and sudden wit of subtle
political rhetoric. For example, who would expect to find in the
article supplied by Diderot entitled “Agnus Scythicus” (a
botanical term; the article is classed as a botanical one) an
appeal for the just classification and appraisal of historical
evidence, an appeal to avoid superstitious credulity? Sporadi
cally plagued by (and ever conscious of) the off-again, on-again
censorship of the Ancien Re'gime, the editors were sometimes
surprisingly bold while under a real compulsion to be careful of
what they said. This political temerity makes the best “copy”
out of the Encyclope'die today (though the degree of its boldness
is debated), but we can also find woven into the wide loom of its
format a fascinating display of eighteenth century thought on a
host of subjects. The editors adopted Bacon’s schema of the
fields of human knowledge, classifying their articles under
sub-headings related to Memory, Reason, or Imagination.^
For modern readers interested in history (here classified under
Memory) the Encyclope'die is an almost inexhaustible treasure.
One is struck repeatedly by the concerns of the philosophes for
the critical examination of historical data, by their appreciation
1

of the importance of a knowledge of ancient languages in the
study of history, and by their expressed interest in the preserva
tion of historical documents and materials. One can see, too, in
such an article as Dipldme” by Lenglet du Fresnoy, the extent
of scientific knowledge called into play in establishing the
authenticity of documents. And as a source of information on
eighteenth century philosophies of history the Encyclopedie is
also rich.2 Within a representative group of some fifty or so
articles in the Encyclopedie related to feudal jurisprudence, one
can find ideas about history ranging from seeing it as the glorifi
cation of great houses and noble people (a typically sixteenth
century view) through the utilitarian Enlightenment concept that
history should serve the ends of the philosophes, and extending
to a conception of history that is strikingly modern (in certain
aspects) in the articles of Boucher d’Argis on feudal law.
Generally speaking, the philosophes wrote off the Middle Ages
as having nothing to contribute to the Enlightenment. A tendency
in the Encyclopedie is to talk about the Middle Ages as the
centuries of ignorance”; for Voltaire (article “Histoire”), the
history of this period is the “. . . histoire barbare de peuples
barbares, qui devenus chre"tiens n’en deviennent pas meilleurs.”
( . . . barbarous history of barbaric peoples who, on becoming
Christian, become no better.”) But this general idea of eighteenth
century views on the Middle Ages seems to deserve some further
examination, for in looking at this group of articles on feudal law
and feudal institutions one finds oneself stationed at a cross
roads of political discussion in eighteenth century France, where
certain developments of the Middle Ages are taken very seriously.
It is essential to see in these articles the reflection of the
political debate on the reform of the monarchy, and especially
the reflection of the confrontation of the these royale (“royal
thesis”) and the these nobiliaire (“noble thesis”) during the
course of the eighteenth century.
Briefly explained, the these nobiliaire was the theory that the
necessary reconstruction of the government should depend on
autonomous powers held by the nobles to make of them a sort of
intermediate body to limit the sovereignty of the king and to
protect the fundamental laws of France. The these royale, on the
other hand, held that France must have a strong monarchy based
on the bourgeoisie which would suppress all intermediate powers,
especially those of the nobility and of the Parlements.3
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In 1727 Boulainvilliers published a book, Histoire de Vancien
gouvernement de la France, in which he connected the history of
the ^^centuries of ignorance” with the these nohiliaire. He said
that feudalism was as old as the Frankish monarchy, and that the
history of the French kingdom was one of the usurpation by the
king of feudal powers held by the nobles. In 1734, the abbe
Dubos, in Histoire critique de Vetablissement de la monarchie
fran^ise, saw in those same centuries connections with (and
evidence for) the these royale. He held that feudalism was a
corruption of the monarchy which, in its beginnings, was the
inheritor and a continuation of the Imperium Romanum. The
Frankish kings were officers of the Roman Empire which, under
Justinian (527-565), had ceded Gaul to them. Thus, the feudal
nobles were usurpers of royal power. Montesquieu, writing in
L’Esprit des Lois (1748) of the origins of feudal institutions
(especially in Books XXVIH, XXX, XXXI) disputed the “facts”
cited by the abbe' Dubos, because he (Montesquieu) was partial
to the these nohiliaire; although he criticized briefly the argu
ments of Boulainvilliers (Book XXX, chapter x) he followed them
fairly closely in these parts of his work.4
Arriving then at the articles on feudal jurisprudence in the

Encyclopedie, most of which were written by Boucher d’Argis,
lawyer and member of the Parlement of Paris, one wonders how
he is going to treat this dispute. Jacques Proust, in his book on
the Encyclope'die, says, “Sur les origines de la monarchie
fran^aise les encyclopedistes sont en ge'ne'ral favorables a la
these germaniste plutot qu^a la these romaniste et ils tirent
volontiers la the'orie d’une monarchie plus ou moins tempe're'e.”^
(“Concerning the origins of the French monarchy the Encyclo
pedists are in general favorable to the Germanic [noble] theory
rather than to the Romanist [royal] thesis and they willingly draw
the theory of a more or less limited monarchy.”) Proust also
quotes Rene'Hubert, who “. . . a montre' que les encyclope'distes,
comme les de'fenseurs des parlements, se pre'sentaient plus
volontiers en restaurateurs qu’en re'formateurs.”6 (“. . . showed
that the Encyclopedists, as the defenders of the parlements,
showed themselves to be more willingly restorers than re
formers.”) Considering the total thrust of the articles written by
Boucher d’Argis, we find no real reason to dispute this general
summary of the political views of “the Encyclopedists.” Nor
would we dispute it judging from those articles penned by the
Chevalier de Jaucourt on feudal institutions. But from a point of
view relating to philosophies of history, there is something to
3

add, for differences in views about history set in motion an
obvious dialogue in certain similarly titled articles of Boucher
d’Argis and of Jaucourt, which will be examined later. First,
though, we examine the articles of Boucher d’Argis and repeat
our question. How is he going to treat the dispute of the these
nobiliaire and the these royale?
It was with the third volume of the Encyclopedie (1753) that
Antoine Gaspard Boucher d’Argis, lawyer of the Paris Parlement
and advisor of the sovereign court of Dombes, began his task of
writing the articles on law. D’Alembert, writing in the foreword
of this volume, welcomes him: “Grace aux soins de M. Boucher
d’Argis, tres connu par ses excellens ouvrages, la Jurisprudence,
cette science malheureusement si ne'cessaire, et en meme terns
si e'tendue, va desormais paroitre dans VEncyclopedie avec le
de'tail et la dignite'' qu’elle me^rite.” (“Thanks to the labors of
Monsieur Boucher d’Argis, well known for his excellent writings.
Jurisprudence, that science unfortunately so necessary and at
the same time so vast, will from now on appear in the Encyclo
pedie with the detail and the dignity which it deserves.”) We
also know this Boucher d’Argis from the words of Rene' Hubert
(quoted, in English, by Nelly Schargo), “He is not a critic; he is
an historian.”^ Boucher d’Argis himself, in the article “Juris
prudence” (Vol. IX, 81b) gives the reason for his historical
procedures in the articles he writes: “. . . pour bien pe'ne'trer
I’esprit d’un usage, il faut en connoitre I’origine et les progres . . .” (“. . . to comprehend fully the spirit of a practice, it
is necessary to know its origin and its development . . .”) And
that is his guide in his articles; he speaks of the origin and
traces the development of a practice, a law, or a term, analyzing
various theories and interpretations relative to it as he writes.
Is the judgment of Hubert, “historian, not critic,” a just one? It
seems to be. But to see in what ways it is true, we turn to the
question of the political debate — that arena of which Nelly
Schargo seems so strangely unaware, saying that in the Encyclo
pedie, “Strange as it may seem, medieval and feudal law is more
fully represented than Roman as a subdivision of general legal
history.’’^
Boucher d’Argis cites sources frequently, giving the name of
the author, the work, the page numbers, and reading him from a
present-day perspective, one expects to encounter the name of
Montesquieu, for L’Esprit des Lois had appeared five years
prior to the first Encyclopedie articles of Boucher d’Argis. The
4

name of Montesquieu, however, does not appear.^ One wonders if
it is possible that he is unaware of this work. Then one realizes
that he is very much aware of Montesquieu’s viewpoints on the
origins of feudal institutions, for these theories appear as what
“someone” has said, or are sometimes part of a summary state
ment about various explanations of what Boucher d’Argis is
discussing at the moment — explanations which he is going to
refute or correct or elaborate. Then one wonders if Boucher
d’Argis holds to the contrary theory (these royale) from that of
Montesquieu’s preference. There are some indications, espe
cially in the first articles that Boucher d’Argis wrote, that such
is indeed the case. For example, in speaking about the corvee
(article of this title, IV, 280 ff.), he speaks of lords “. . . qui,
dans les commencements de la monarchie, ne tenoient leurs
seigneuries qu’a titre d’offices et de be'ne'fices a vie ou a terns,
vers la fin de la seconde race et au commencement de la
troisieme, se rendirent proprie'taires de leurs seigneuries; iis
usurperent la puissance publique et tons les droits qui en
dependoient.” (“. . . who, in the early days of the monarchy, had
held their titles only by virtue of offices or benefits for their
lifetime or limited to some other time span, toward the end of the
second reigning house [the Carolingians] and the beginning of
the third [the Capetians] had made themselves the owners of
their manors; they usurped the public power and all the rights
that depended on it.” Italics by present writer.) Further, in the
long and important article “Coutume” (IV, 411b-4l5b), he
mentions “. . . les dues, les comtes, et autres officiers royaux,
s’etant attrihue la proprie^te'' des villes et provinces dont ils
n’avoient que I’administration, et les plus puissants d’entr’eux
s’e'tant meme elrige's en souverains, entreprirent chacun de donner
des lois a leurs sujets. . . ” (“. . . dukes, counts and other
royal officers, having taken over for themselves the property of
cities and provinces whose administration only they possessed,
and the most powerful of whom having set themselves up as
sovereigns, undertook, each one, to give laws to their subjects
. . .” Italics by present writer.) Even later, in the article
“Justice seigneuriale” (IX, 97a-99b), when Boucher d’Argis is
speaking of various theories of the origins of this institution, he
says, “H y a meme lieu de croire que I’institution des justices
seigneuriales, du moins pour les simples justices qui n’ont
aucun titre de dignite'’, est plus ancienne que les fiefs tels qu’ils
se formerent dans le terns dont on vient de parler, et que ces
justices sont presque aussi anciennes que Fe'^tablissement de la
monarchie. . .” (“There is even reason to believe that the
5

institution of manor courts, at least for the simple courts with no
particular higher designation, is older than the fiefs such as they
came to be in the period of which we were just speaking, and
that these courts are almost as old as the establishment of the
monarchy. ) Further on in the same article: “L’origine de la
plfipart des justices seigneuriales est si ancienne que la plupart
des seigneurs n’ont point le titre primitif de concession; soit que
leur justice soit de^rive'e du commandement militaire qu’avoient
leurs pre'decesseurs, soit que ceux-ci Tayent usurpe'e dans des
terns de trouble et de reVolution.” (“The origin of most of the
manor courts is so old that most of the lords do not have the
original title, either for the reason that their court was derived
from the military command of their predecessors, or because
these predecessors had usurped it during periods of unrest and
revolution.” Italics of “usurped” by present writer.)
This view of the origins of manor courts is clearly opposed to
that of Montesquieu. Of the many paragraphs Montesquieu devotes
to an opposing theory (one more favorable to the these nobiliaire),
we quote these two sentences as a summary. “La justice fut
done, dans les fiefs anciens et dans les fiefs nouveaux, un droit
inhe'rent au fief mfeme, un droit lucratif qui en faisoit partie.
C est pour cela que, dans tous les temps, elle a e^'te'' regarde'^e
ainsi; d’ou est ne" ce principe que les justices sont patrimoniales
en France.”10 (“[The dispensing ofl Justice was then, in the
old fiefs as well as in the new form, a right inherent in the fief
itself, a lucrative right which was an essential part of it. It is
for that reason that it [the dispensing of justice] has been thus
regarded at all periods, and from which view derives the prin
ciple that judgeships are hereditary in France.”) But before we
see in this opposition of theories evidence that Boucher d’Argis
is promoting the these royale we must read the rest of his same
article, where he goes on to say that it is an error to trace the
origins of manor courts back to the Romans.
The article “Fief” (Jurisprudence) (VI, 693b-698a)l 1 is one
where it seems especially clear that Boucher d’Argis is writing
carefully and that he is trying to be as impartial and objective in
the political debate as it is possible to be — the ideal sine qua
non of modern historians, regardless of their varying interpreta
tions of the procedures necessary for attempting to reach this
ideal, and regardless, too, of their estimate of the possibility of
attaining it. Boucher d’Argis seems, in this article as usual, to
be writing without partisan ideas and in the best light which
6

authorities and documents give him.^2 As usual, he begins by
discussing origins: “L’origine des fiefs est un des points les
plus obscurs et les plus embrouille's de notre histoire; elle
paroit venir de I’ancienne coutume^ de toutes les nations,
d’imposer un hommage et un tribut au plus faible.” (“The origin
of fiefs is one of the most obscure and confused points in our
history; it seems to have come from the old custom of all nations
of imposing an hommage and a tribute on the weakest.”) Further
on, “On trouve done des le terns des Remains le premier modele
des fiefs, et I’obligation du service militaire impose'e aux
possesseurs.” (“One finds, then, from the days of the Romans
the first model of fiefs, and the obligation of military service
imposed on those possessing them.”) And further yet Jn the
article, “Mais nonobstant ces diverses opinions, il paroit con
stant que I’usage des fiefs est venu en France du nord: qu’il y
fut apporte" par les Francs lorsqu’ils firent la conquete des
Gaules.” (“But in spite of these diverse opinions, it seems
established that the custom of fiefs came into France from the
north; that it was brought there by the Franks when they con
quered the Gauls.”) And in this last-quoted statement Boucher
d’Argis shows himself (though he does not say so) to be sharing
(on this point) the opinion of Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu,
the latter of whom had vigorously refuted the theory set forth by
the abb e"" Dub os on their Roman origin.
Should one conclude that Boucher d’Argis is timid or vacillat
ing? Jacques Proust calls him “le moins hardi” (“the least
bold”) of all the leading Encyclopedists.But is it not a
question here of a more “modern” attitude to history, rather than
of a lack of temerity? Did not Boucher d’Argis say that in order
to comprehend the spirit of laws it is necessary to know the
circumstances of their origin, and through what changes they
have passed? We will examine later his attitude toward the
Middle Ages, for it is precisely there, in the effort to understand
the mentality of another age, that we most clearly encounter the
modern spirit of historical writing.And it is interesting to note
at this point that a recent history of French law (Olivier-Martin,
Histoire du droit fran^ais des origines d la Revolution, 1951)
treats this question of the origin of feudal legal institutions in a
manner parallel to that of Boucher d’Argis, noting the same
mixture of customs from the Gauls, the Romans and the Franks.l^
Olivier-Martin adds the idea (which helps to explain the mixture)
of the res publica which existed among the Romans, disappeared
during the reign of the Merovingians (when the regnum Francorum
7
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was the property, the possession of the king), to return with the
Carolingians because of the increasing intermarriage among
peoples, making territorial considerations of greater and greater
importance, and causing the return — by necessity ~ to the
Roman conception of sovereignty. 17
But let us look for a moment at the articles in the Encyclo
pedic written by the Chevalier de Jaucourt on feudal law and
institutions. It is of him that Jacques Proust says, “II est
probable qu’il a pu tres t6t de'charger Diderot du soin e'crasant
de supple^’er dans toutes les parties les articles manquants.”!®
(“It is likely that he was able early to relieve Diderot of the
crushing burden of supplying missing articles for all topics.”)
In two parallel articles — “Noblesse” (Jurisprudence) by Boucher
d’Argis and “Noblesse, Haute” (Histoire de France) by Jaucourt
— it is obvious that the two writers have rather different aims
though their political views may well be similar. 19 Jaucourt, in
his article, wants to speak of origins - but it is only of Germanic
ones that he speaks. “Les peuples du nord avoient une estime
toute particuliere pour la valeur militaire . . . pour les distinguer
des paysans ou routuriers, ils appelloient 7io6/es ceux qui avoient
delendu leur patrie avec courage, et qui avoient accru leur
domination par les guerres: or pour re^'compense de leurs services
dans le partage des terres conquises, ils leur donnerent des
francs fiefs, a condition de continuer a rendre a leur patrie les
memes services qu’ils lui avoient deja rendus.” (XI, 172b-l73a)
(“The peoples of the north had an esteem for military value that
was particularly theirs ... to distinguish them from peasants or
commoners, they called nobles those who had defended their
homeland courageously, and who had acquired their domination
through wars: then for payment of their services in the distri
buting of conquered land, they gave them free (exempt) fiefs on
the condition that they continue to give their fatherland the same
services which they had already given.’’)
Boucher d’Argis speaks with more detail of origins; the Gauls
had a nobility, “. . .I’ordre des chevaliers distingue'des druides
et du commun du peuple.” (XI, 168b) (“. . . the order of knights
distinguished from the Druids and from common people.”) And
the Romans, having made the conquest of the Gauls, “. , .
e'tablirent peu-a-peu les regies du leur noblesse . . . Enfin,
lorsque les Francs eurent a leur tour conquis les Gaules sur les
Remains, cette nation victorieuse forma le principal corps de la
noblesse en France.” (*^ . . established little by little the rules
8

of their nobility . . . Finally, when the Franks had in their turn
conquered the Gauls through the Romans, this victorious nation
formed the chief body of the nobility in France.”) Further on in
the article he says, “II y avoit done au commencement de la
monarchie trois sortes de nobles; les uns qui descendoient des
chevaliers gaulois qui faisoient profession de porter les armes,
d’autres qui venoient de magistrats remains, lesquels joignoient
Fexercice des armes a I’administration de la justice et au
gouvernement civil et des finances, et la troisieme sorte de
nobles e'toit les Francs qui, faisant profession des armes,
e'toient exempts de toutes servitudes personnelles et imposi
tions . .
(“There were, then, in the beginning of the monarchy
three kinds of nobles; the ones who were descended from those
knights among the Gauls who made a profession of bearing arms,
others who came from the Roman magistrates, who joined the
bearing of arms to the administration of justice and to civil
government and finance, and the third kind of nobles was the
Franks who, being soldiers by profession, were exempt from all
personal servitude and assessment . . .”)
We sense in comparing these two parallel articles the kind of
thorough, impartial examination Boucher d’Argis characteristi
cally prefers to the unified, unambiguous thrust of Jaucourt’s
articles. If Boucher d’Argis does have an idee fixe when he
writes of the origins of feudal institutions, it is the idea of the
dignity of the noblesse de robe; one might suspect such a
prejudice when he speaks of the nobles descended from Roman
magistrates in this article “Noblesse”, or similarly, when he
insists, in the article “Etats” (VI, 26a), “Chez les Remains la
noblesse ne re'sidoit que dans Tordre des senateurs, qui e'toit
Fe'tat de la robe. L’ordre des chevaliers n’avoit de rang qu’apres
celui des se'nateurs, et ne jouissoit point d’une noblesse parfaite,
mais seulement de quelques marques d’honneur.” (“Among the
Romans, nobility consisted only in the order of senators, which
was the estate of the robe. The order of knights had rank only
after that of senators, and did not enjoy perfect nobility, but only
some marks of honor.”) But on many occasions where Boucher
d’Argis could have profited from the occasion to put forth his own
ideas (those which one might expect from a lawyer associated
with the Parlement of Paris) or those political ideas dear to the
philosophes, he does not do so. In “Lit de Justice,” for example,
there is nothing but the history of the institution and a descrip
tion of the ceremony. In “Remontrances” (a short article) he
says only (after having defined the word) that the sovereign
9

courts have this right in relationship to the king. This habit on
Boucher d’Argis’ part of writing from an almost purely historical
and descriptive point of view evidently exasperated Jaucourt
eventually, and in some articles which he wrote parallel to the
long, scholarly treatises by Boucher d’Argis, one can find the
tone desired by Jaucourt, sometimes utilising historical informa
tion and sometimes not. For example, Boucher d’Argis wrote
“Gabelle” (Jurisprudence) (the “gabelle” was the salt tax);
Jaucourt wrote “SeT’ (‘‘salt’O, a short article full of sentences
such as, “La douleur s’empare de notre coeur a la lecture de
I’ordonnance des gabelles.”20 (“Sorrow seizes our hearts when
we read the salt tax law.”) This impatience of Jaucourt’s is
especially clear in the article “Taille a Volonte'” (“discre
tionary tax”). After having complained about the injustice of the
law, Jaucourt says:
J’entends deja des gens de loi me dire que c’est une suite
de’ la loi qui attachait les serfs a la terre. Je pourrais
repondre que tous les taillables ne sont pas, a beaucoup
pres, issus de serfs; mais, sans sender Tobscurite barbare
de ces temps-la, il s’agit de savoir si I’usage est bon ou
mauvais, et non pas de connaitre son ori^ine. Les rois
trouverent avantageux pour eux et pour leur etat d’abolir les
servitudes, et comme Texperience a Justifie leur sage
politique, il ne faut plus raisonner d’apres les principes de
servitude.21
(I can already hear lawyers telling me that it is a conse
quence of the law which attached serfs to the soil. I might
reply that all taxables are by no means sprung from serfs;
but, without probing the barbarous obscurity of those times,
it is a question of knowing if the law is good or bad and not
of being acquainted with its origin. The kings have found it
advantageous to themselves and to their state to abolish
servitude, and as experience has justified their wise
political action, one must no longer reason according to the
principles of servitude.)

Should we see in Boucher d’Argis a reactionary force wanting
to conserve the antiquated institutions of the Ancien Re"gime?
On reading him, the word “reactionary” seems much too strong,
the word “conservator” perhaps more just, but the word “re
storer” much better, in the sense of the restoration of a ration
ality equivalent to that of the origins of the institutions, but
appropriate to the more developed society of the eighteenth
century. Even the word “reformer” is not unimaginable for him,
if one can judge by one of those rare occasions when Boucher
d’Argis lets his personal views be known. This is the article
“Cofitiime” (Jurisprudence) (IV, 411b-4l5b). After having spoken
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of the codification of the hitherto unwritten laws {coutumes)^
Boucher d’Argis says, “Louis XI avoit, dit-on, dessein de
re'duire toutes les cofitumes du royaume en une seule, et que I’on
us^t partout du meme poids et de la meme mesure, Ce loiiable
dessein est demeure" jusqu’a pre'sent sans exe'cution.” (“Louis
the Eleventh had, they say, intentions of reducing all the custom
based laws of the kingdom into a single code, and of having
people all use the same weights and measures. This praiseworthy
plan has remained unexecuted up to the present time.”) Then he
poses the question of whether the well-known decrees of Mon
sieur le premier president de Lamoignon are a renewal of this
idea, and he speaks of the various difficulties noted by Monsieur
Auzanet in the attempts to arrive at a common set of laws.
Boucher d’Argis continues:
Ces considerations ne paroissent cependant pas capables
de balancer I’avantage commun que Ton retireroit de n’avoir
qu’une seule loi. N’est-il pas etrange de voir dans un m^me
royaume tant de coutumes differentes; et que dans une meme
province ou il se trouve plusieurs coutumes locales dont le
ressort n est separe que par une riviere ou par un chemin,
ce qui est repute juste d’un c^te, soit repute injuste de
Tautre? La prevention des peuples pour leurs anciens
usages n’est pas ce que Ton doit consulter, mais le bien
public. En rendant toutes les coutumes uniformes pour
I’avenir, on ne changeroit rien a ce qui auroit ete fait par le
passe; ainsi il n’y auroit nul inconvenient, et il ne seroit
pas plus difficUe de reduire tout a une meme cofitume que
de reduire tout a un poids et une mesure.
(These considerations, however, do not seem capable of
outweighing the advantage that we would all derive from
having but a single law. Isn’t it strange to see in the same
kingdom so many different legal usages; that in the same
province where there are several local systems of justice
whose jurisdiction is separated only by a river or by a road,
what is considered right on one side is wrong on the other?
The prejudices of people for their old ways is not what
should be considered, but the public good. By making all
legal codes uniform for acts in the future, one would change
nothing of what had been done in the past; thus there would
be no real disadvantage, and it would be no more difficult
to reduce everything to the same legal code than to reduce
everything to one system of weights and of measures.

If one can judge by that, and by what his style sometimes lets
show (the repetition, for example, of the idea that one man alone
— the King — holds at that time the first rights to hunting, in the
article “Chasse”), one can indeed believe that the political
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opinions of Boucher d’Argis and of Jaucourt and the other
Encyclopedists in general are not so very different.
The differences, then, of aim and of tone in the articles
written by Boucher d’Argis and those written by Jaucourt have
three probable causes, it would seem. First, the differences in
personality (judged on their style) and the fact that Jaucourt is
less learned than Boucher d’Argis. Secondly, the system for the
classification of articles in the Encyclopedie may have influ
enced their orientation; those of Boucher d’Argis are, for the
most part, classified “Jurisprudence” (which, in the schema of
the Encyclopedists, belongs to civil history — the acts of men);
those of Jaucourt are mainly classified “Droit politique”
(“political law”) or “Gouvernement politique” (“political
government”) which belong to “Histoire litteraire” — the ideas
of men. But the most important reason for the differences would
seem to be that the two men do not have the same philosophy in
regard to history. Jaucourt evidently has the idea that history
should serve the aims of the philosophes (d’Alembert had said
as much in discussing Memory and Reason in the Discours preliminaire to the Encyclopedie). Boucher d’Argis sees history
more purely; for him it is not a question of judging but of describ
ing and (as we shall soon see) of reconstructing as much as
possible the mentality of the past in the mind of the historian.
The view of Jaucourt has some important consequences when
one reflects on the accusations by the modern philosopher
Collingwood that “the historical outlook of the Enlightenment
was not genuinely historical; in its main motive it was polemical
and anti-historical.”22 This may be true, in general, in relation
ship to a philosophy of history such as that Collingwood holds
in the twentieth century. But when we try to understand the
viewpoint of the Encyclopedists we realize that they found it
legitimate to ask Memory (under which Baconian classification
history is found) to serve the ends of Reason; thus, this use of
history (the past) for the aims of the present (that use which we
call propaganda23) ^vas not blameworthy for most of the Encyclo
pedic writers. This is why, no doubt, Jaucourt had a tendency to
grow impatient with the more “modem” historian, Boucher
d’Argis. (Or, of course, we might not want to discount an impa
tience, eventually, with the historical method of reasoning •—
that kind of impatience which had provoked the celebrated
question of Helvetius to Montesquieu about whether it is neces
sary to inherit all the accumulated errors since the origin of
12

man.24)

Voltaire is also impatient with research into the feudal
origins of governmental institutions, but for the reason that we
cannot know enough of the history of that barbarous and irrational
age to judge well. We note what he says in the article “Histoire.
“Pour pelne'trer dans le labyrinthe tenel3reux du moyen age il faut
le secours des archives, et on n’en a presque point. Quelques
anciens convents ont conserve' des chartres, des dipldmes, qui
contiennent des donations dont Pautorite' est quelquefois contestee; ce n’est pas la un recueil oil Von puisse s’e'clairer sur
Thistoire politique et sur le droit public de PEurope.’’ (VIII,
223b)25 (“To penetrate into the shadowy labyrinth of the Middle
Ages one must have the help of archives, and we have hardly
any. Some former convents have preserved some charters, some
documents which contain deeds whose authenticity is sometimes
questioned; that is not a collection where one can be enlightened
on the political history and on the public law of Europe.”) The
widely-held view of the eighteenth century that the “centuries of
ignorance” had hardly anything to contribute to the century of
the Enlightenment (outside of the context of the these nohiliaire
and the these royale) tended to deny any reasonableness to this
early period — which impels Collingwood to say that the histori
cal writing of the Enlightenment is “anti-historical.” For, he
says, “A truly historical view of human history sees everything
in that history as having its own raison d etre and coming into
existence in order to serve the needs of the men whose minds
have corporately created it.”26
On this note, we return to the articles of Boucher d’Argis, for
this scholarly lawyer, author of several treatises on the history
of jurisprudence, had studied the documents, the laws of the
Middle Ages, and it is clear that he sees (as a lawyer and as a
historian) a logic, a rationality in the development of the law
during this period. The evidence is frequent in his articles. For
example, in the article “Chasse” (Jurisprudence) (III, 225b228a), where he traces the progressive limitations on this right
of the hunt (which at first had been free to all men) to its con
temporary situation (where the King alone holds first rights to
hunting), Boucher d’Argis attributes the limitation under
Charles VI (that young king who, before becoming insane, had
wanted to give generously the permission to hunt in the pre
serves) to the fact that the forests were becoming denuded of
wild life. Thus, what had been reasonable at that time had
created a precedent of more and more strict limitation.
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Another example: in the article “Coutume” (IV, 411b-415b),
Boucher d’Argis defines droit coutumier (“customary law”) by
opposition to droit ecrit (“written law”) and traces the process
by which the coutumes had been codified, beginning during the
reign of Saint Louis, Boucher d’Argis, who had studied the
documents, noticed in some of them a style grossier (“clumsy
(unpolished) style”) and little in the way of methodical order; he
explains this:
La coutume de Ponthieu fut redigee par les officiers des
lieux, seuls. La plupart des autres Pont ete par des
commissaires nommes par le Roi, et tires ordinairement du
corps du parlement, lesquels ont preside a rassemblee des
etats, et arr&ie les articles en la forme ou ils sont; mais
n’ayant eu le terns de composer eux-m^mes les cahiers des
coiitumes, ni de les corriger a loisir, ce sont les officiers
du pays qui ont eu le plus de part a la redaction; c’est
pourquoi le style de la plfipart de ces cdiXtumes est si
grossier, et il s’y trouve si peu d’ordre et de methode; ce
qui n’emp^che pas que les commissaires qui y ont preside,
ne fussent des gens de merite. (p. 413a)
(The document of legal practice of Ponthieu was codified
by [judicial] officers of those parts, alone. Most of the
others were prepared by commissioners named by the King,
and drawn usually from among members of the Parlement.
These men presided at the assembly of the estates, and
decided on the articles in the form they now have; but not
having had time themselves to make up the collections of
local usage laws, nor to correct them at leisure, it was the
petty officials of the region who were primarily responsible
for drawing these up; that is why the style of lYiese coutumes
is so unpolished, and why there is in them so little order
and method; which doesn’t mean at all that the commis
sioners who presided over the task were not men of merit.)

Simileu-ly, in the article “Etablissemens de S. Louis” Boucher
d’Argis explains the frequent quotations seen there (some people
having found them surprising, he says, in such a document),
. . I’on doit ^tre d’autant moins surpris de trouver tant de
citations dans ces e'tablissemens, que c’eToit-la I’ordonnance la
plus considerable qui eut eTe' faite; que I’idee eToit de faire un
code geneTal, et que I’on n’avoit pas alors I’esprit de pre^'cision
et le ton d’autorite" qui convient dans la le'gislation.” (“. . . one
should be the less surprised to find so many quotations in this
code in that it was the most comprehensive ordinance which had
yet been made, in that the idea was to put together a general
code, and in that there did not exist at that time the spirit of
precision and the tone of authority appropriate to legislation.”)
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Boucher d’Argis is evidently replying here in this article (though
he does not mention it) to the arguments of Montesquieu (Book
XXVIII, chapter xxxvii) that this code was never meant to serve
as a law for the whole kingdom. Boucher d’Argis sees no problem
in believing this code to be indeed a general code of Saint Louis,
in spite of a lack of precision and in spite of the quotations
within it. Here once again, he is looking for an explanation for a
surprising kind of style — but this time, he is wrong, and it is
Montesquieu who is right. Olivier-Martin says that this work is a
private compilation, a collection of usages, which its unknown
author had stuffed with Roman and canonical texts to display his
erudition 127 One cannot always be right!
This does serve to underline that one cannot, finally, push too
far the idea of a completely “modern” perspicacity on the part of
Boucher d’Argis toward the Middle Ages. He, too, like Voltaire,
was a man of the eighteenth century. He, too, used the word
barbare. “On fut sans doute aussi bien aise de quitter la loi
salique, a cause de la barbarie qu’elle marquait de nos anc^tres,
tant pour la langue que pour les moeurs. .
(“Loi Salique”
IX, 670) (“They were doubtless also well quit of the Salic law,
because of the barbarity to which it testified on the part of our
ancestors, as much in language as in morals (mores).”) But
Boucher d’Argis does indeed make an effort to understand, in the
documents with which he is acquainted, the mentality, the
rationale of those who had written them. And it is this effort
which is such an important aspect of the procedures of modern
historians.
Montesquieu, less disinterested than Boucher d’Argis in his
studies of feudal law, also shows evidence of this effort to
understand — an attitude at times even more clearly “modern” in
its scope than that of the Encyclopedie writer. For Montesquieu
utilizes not only legal documents but also those recounting the
lives of the saints (Book XXX, chapter xi). He tells us, in
speaking of the captives of Pepin’s army:
. . . c’est dans la vie des saints que Ton trouve les plus
grands ^laircissements sur cette matiere. Quoiqu’on puisse
reprocher aux auteurs de ces vies d’avoir ete quelquefois
un peu trop credules sur des choses que Dieu a certainement faites si elles ont ete dans I’ordre de ses desseins,
on ne laisse pas d’en tirer de grandes lumieres sur les
moeurs et les usages de ces temps-la. . . Tous ces ecrits
froids, secs, insipides et durs, il faut les lire, il faut les
devorer, comme la fable dit que Saturne devorait les

15

pierres.28
(. . . it is in the documents on the lives of the saints where
one finds the greatest illumination on this question.
Although one can reproach the authors of these lives for
having been sometimes a bit too credulous concerning
things which God certainly did if they were in the unfolding
of his design, one nevertheless draws from them great
enlightenment about the mores and customs of those times
. , . All those cold, dry, insipid and difficult writings must
be read, devoured, as the fable says Saturn devoured
stones.)

This is an idea which Jaucourt echoes in the article “Vie des
saints.’
In the Encyclopedie, within the schema of outline for the
articles known as the Systeme figure des connais sauces
humaines, “history” (and the subheading “civil history”) are
found under the heading of “Memory.” But this Baconian view
has been surpassed by modern historians; history is not just
attached to a category of Memory (which Collingwood makes
equivalent to “statements of authorities”) but can reconstruct
by scientific methods a picture of the past which does not depend
on any tradition or continuity.29 Jn view of this claim, it is
interesting to see if modern historians can tell us things which
differ in kind (and not just in quantity and precision) from what
the historians of the Encyclope'die tell us about feudal law. One
topic serves us here by way of experiment, that of the capitulaires, those laws promulgated by the Carolingian kings in the
presence of an assembly of bishops and lords of the realm. (The
article on them in the Encyclopedie is rather short, having been
written by Mallet and d’Alembert before Boucher d’Argis came on
the scene, but the latter adds much information on them in
various articles under other titles.)
In the conclusion of a rather short but very interesting book,
Recherches sur les capfii^Zaires, published in 1958 and written by
F. J. Ganshof^O o^e can find four ideas about the capitulaires
which seem to be different from anything the Encyclopedists tell
us:
(1) an idea that our knowledge about the capitulaires is
uncertain (the Encyclopedists, with less research, make no
such avowal)
(2) an idea that the capitulaires are not a single block or
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kind of law, though they belong to a limited period of
history (the Encyclopedists do not make any distinction,
but treat them as a unit)
(3) an idea of the very limited place that actual legislation
occupies in the capitulaires (the Encyclopedists treat them
only as laws)
(4) an idea that the characteristics of what is written are
very limited in comparison to what was oral in the lawmak
ing processes of the Carolingians; the terms in which the
decision of the king was written down are rarely decisive
when it comes to interpreting a capitulaire (the Encyclo
pedists do not have this concept of an oral environment)

It would seem that especially in the fourth idea expressed in the
modem book and summarized above, it is clear how modem
historians have gone beyond an idea of history as dependent on
the statements of authorities to write a new history of the
“centuries of ignorance” the Encyclopedists visualized.
In the introduction of the book on the history of French law by
Olivier-Martin, he speaks of sources of our knowledge of the
history of law. He mentions, of course, legal documents, but he
also speaks of the importance of “monuments de la pratique”
(“records of practices”) such as polyptyques (detailed descrip
tions of the possessions of certain monasteries) dipWmes
(records of sale, gifts, wills) and formulaires (collections of
models serving lawyers in drawing up judicial acts). Searching
the Encyclopedie for evidence of whether or not the writers there
were conscious of these sources, one finds no mention of
polyptyques; the value of the formulaires was acknowledged; but
it is in the article “Diplome” (by Lenglet du Fresnoy) that one
uncovers, not the idea of using such documents for the under
standing of the history of law, but rather a wealth of illumination
on further eighteenth century ideas about history. It is there that
we come to realize the tremendous importance in the eighteenth
century of the authenticity of documents (and hence that one
common view of the role of history is that of establishing this
authenticity), for claims to nobility and to property hinged on
these papers. It is there that we realize how much acquaintance
with scientific procedures historians did have to serve them in
this process — examination of inks, of parchments, of styles of
handwriting, of seals, etc. It is also there that one finds the
cautionary note that the documents which one must examine with
especially careful exactitude are those of abbeys, of the property
of religious communities and even of cathedral churches. For it
17

seems that the article writer would have one know that there had
been forgers among the regular and the secular clergy! Caught by
surprise again, we see the Encyclopedie preaching the Enlight
enment in an unlikely place, showing its propensity for religious
skepticism where the censor is not so likely to look. Monument
to the philosophes’ faith in the efficacy of human reason, the
Encyclopedie invited all branches of human knowledge to contri
bute to their goals. We realize that it was somewhat by exception
that Boucher d’Argis saw his discipline more purely.

NOTES
^We cannot forget to acknowledge, either, in speaking of the Encyclo^
pedie, the vast compilation of technical know-how presented to its
subscribers, supported by the separate volumes of plates (illustrating
manufacturing processes and scientific and craft techniques) which were
published after the seventeen volumes of articles.
^We should note here the distinction between the expression “philo
sophy of history” which Jacques Proust, for example, uses when he
speaks of a common philosophy of history on the part of the Encyclo
pedists (L* Encyclopedie, pp. 148-149) and the meaning of this expres
sion when a writer like R. G. Collingwood uses it, as in The Idea of
History where he says (page 2), “For the philosopher, the fact demand
ing attention is neither the past by itself, as it is for the historian, nor
the historian’s thought about it, as it is for the psychologist, but the
two things in their mutual relation.” Or, in Philosophy of History,
W. H. Walsh says (page 119), “The term ‘philosophy of history’ was
generally understood a hundred years ago in a sense very different from
that given it in the preceding chapters. We have taken it to designate a
critical enquiry into the character of historical thinking, an analysis of
some of the procedures of the historian, and a comparison of them with
those followed in other disciplines. . . But the conception of it enter
tained by most writers on the subject in the nineteenth century was
entirely different. “The” philosophy of history, as they called it, had
as its object history in the sense of res gestae, not historia rerum
gestarum; and the task of its exponents was to produce an interpretation
of the actual course of events showing that a special kind of intelligi
bility could be found in it.” This nineteenth century sense of the phrase,
it would seem, is the sense of the expression as Proust uses it — and
this aspect is interesting — but it is rather the modem sense of the
idea of a philosophy of history among historians which is important for
this present study. In fact, the distinction is a fundamental one; the
Encyclopedists did have (as Proust says) a common philosophy of
history (“Le progres des connaissances humaines est une route tracee
d’ou il est presque impossible de s’ecarter.” “The progress of human
knowledge is a road laid out from which it is almost impossible to
stray.”). But their procedures in writing history were not at all the
same, which reveals philosophies of history (in the modem sense)
which are different. Or, to say the same'thing another way, the Encyclo
pedists ask history to do different things, according to their view of
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what history is.
3Franz Neumann, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Montesquieu, The Spirit of
the Laws, trans., Thomas Nugent (New York, 1949), pp. xix-xxiv.
^Ibid. pp. xxiv-xxix.
^Jacques Proust, L’Encyclopedie (Paris, 1965), p. 146
^Ibid., p. 147.
^Nelly Schargo, History in the
Encyclopedie’* (New York, 1947),
p. 106, quoted from Rene Hubert, Les Sciences sociales dans I' Encyclo
pedie (Paris, 1923), p. 125.
"Schargo, op. cit., p. 116.
^The contrary is true in Jaucourt’s articles; he quotes Montesquieu
often, sometimes saying so, much more often without acknowledging his
source; ^one gets an impression of “deja lu” sometimes in reading
Jaucourt s articles after having read Montesquieu. D’Alembert also
quotes Montesquieu; for example, he added a paragraph to the article
Capitulaires
(by Mallet) to present Montesquieu’s theory about the
disappearance of this kind of law. One gets a rather clear idea of why
Boucher d Argis do^esn t quote Montesquieu as an authority after having
read his article
Jurisprudence.” That is the only place wh ere he
mentions the name of Montesquieu and of UEsprit des lois; he calls
him the
ingenious
author of the work, speaks of the difficulties
(cited by Montesquieu himself) in the study of jurisprudence, and says,
L esprit humain a ses homes: un seul homme ne pent done embrasser
toutes les parties d une science aussi vaste; il vaut mieux en bien
approfondir une partie, que de les effleurer toutes.” (IX, 82a) (“The
human mind has its limits: a single man cannot, therefore, embrace all
the parts of such a vast science; it is better to deepen one’s knowledge
of a part of it than to skim the surface of all of them.”) .
j'j^Montesquieu, Oeuvres completes (Tome II) (Paris, 1951), 920.
The parallel article by Jaucourt, “Fief” (Droit politique, Histoire
litteraire) gives the theories (and frequently the words) of Montesquieu
concerning what follows from the fact that fiefs become hereditary.
Jaucourt says at the beginning of the article that he has no intention of
treating modem fiefs (which he doesn’t) but wishes to consider the
subject Jrom a more general and more noble perspective — that of the
establishment of fiefs. Thus, neither Boucher d’Argis nor Jaucourt
treats the dispute over fiefs which had been a subject of debate since
the sixteenth century.
is interesting to note that Franz Neumann says, “The truth con
tained in Dubos’ thesis is infinitely greater than that of his opponent.”
(op. cit., p. xxvi).
l%ontesquieu, op. cit., 897.
i^^Proust, op. cit., p. 166.
15r. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York, 1956), p. 69ff.
(discussion of Vico) and p. 97 ff. (of Kant).
Especially in Chapter HI, “Les institutions politiques franques.”
^^p. 38.
l^Proust, op. cit., p. 85.
^^There is also an article entitled “Noblesse” (Gouvernement politique)
by Jaucourt, where he echoes the opinions of Montesquieu in regard to
the nobility as an intermediate body limiting the power of the king.
2^John Lough, The **Encyclopedie** of Diderot and d'Alembert (Cam
bridge, 1969), p. 211.
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p. 217. What is interesting here,, too, is that Jaucourt, who
quotes Montesquieu so often and who gives the impression of admiring
him a great deal, shows here that he doesn’t entirely understand him —
or else that, considering the number of years that have gone by from the
beginning of publication to the volume containing the letter “T”, he
doesn’t admire him as much as he did formerly.
^^Collingwood, op. cit., p. 77.
H. Walsh, Philosophy of History (New York, 1960), p. 112.
^^Neumann, op. cit., p. xxvi.
^^If the quality of historical knowledge about the Middle Ages was
always that which it is sometimes in Voltaire’s writings, we would have
reason not to trust such information. He says, for example, that it
wasn’t until 1454, under Charles VII, that the coutumes of France were
set down in writing. (‘‘Histoirp” VIII, 221b) This date is too late by
about two centuries, which Boucher d^Argis notes as an error, without
saying that it is Voltaire who is making it.
^^Collingwood, op. cit., p. 77.
^^Olivier-Martin, op. cit., p. 117.
^^Montesquieu, op. cit., p. 894.
^^Collingwood, op. cit., p. 69.
30pp. 103-105.

Harold B. Hancock

THE WESTERVILLE WHISKEY WARS
Westerville was a quiet, peaceful village of 1200 persons in
the 1870’s. Its most important enterprise was Otterbein Univer
sity, which had been founded in 1847 in buildings once occupied
by Blendon Young Men’s Seminary. The faculty members and 200
students of this United Brethren institution spent an estimated
$60,000 annually in the community. Manufacturing was unimpor
tant, being confined to a grist mill, a saw mill, a tile works, a
spoke factory, and a foundry. Nearby farmers found it a conven
ient crossroads in which to buy supplies.^
Virginia and Dutch settlers from New York had bought land in
the area early in the nineteenth century. After a great camp meet
ing in 1838, Peter and Matthew Westevelt had offered land for a
Methodist educational institution. Part of it was reserved for the
campus of Young Men’s Blendon Seminary, but the remainder was
platted in 1839 and sold as town lots. The new community was
named Westerville in honor of the donors of the land and incor
porated in 1858.^
The village prospered after the Cleveland, Mt. Vernon and
Columbus Railroad constructed in 1872-1873 placed it within a
thirty minute ride of the capital. Merchants erected several tall
brick buildings on the principal business street, the upper stories
being used by fraternal orders. New streets were opened, and old
ones improved. A new town hall contained the post office, jail
and mayor’s office. Two imposing edifices were the Methodist
and Presbyterian churches, while the campus of Otterbein Uni
versity was dominated by a new main building erected in 1871
containing classrooms and a chapel.
The peace and quiet of the community were disturbed in July,
1875, when Henry and Phyloxena Corbin opened a Lager Beer
Saloon” in a small building of three rooms at the corner of Knox
and Main Streets. Tradition was against the new business, for
Westerville had never been hospitable to saloons for long. A
tavern had flourished for a time in 1836, but for twenty years
before the Corbins came, Westerville had been dry."^ One of the
first ordnances passed by the village council in 1859 prohibited
residents in any way from giving, selling, bartering, or disposing
21

of wine, fermented cider, ale, porter, lager beer, or spiritous
liquors. It was one of Ohio’s earliest local prohibition decrees.
Subsequent state legislation in 1874 forbade the absolute exclu
sion of saloons from municipalities, though their regulation was
permitted.^
In spite of the change in the laws of the state, the timing of
the Corbins was bad. The lectures of Dr. Dio Lewis in December,
1873, at Hillsboro, Ohio, initiated a crusade against drink and
led to the formation of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union
in Cleveland in November, 1874. A few days before this meeting,
the ladies of Westerville had ‘‘revived” their temperance meet
ings and probably soon organized a local chapter of the WCTU.
In any case, events were to demonstrate that they were prepared
to battle vigorously against any such establishment, as their
sisters had done in many other Ohio towns and cities.^
The pastors and most of the members of the Methodist, Pres
byterian and United Brethren churches were strongly opposed.
The United Brethren church had first officially taken a stand
against the use of alcoholic beverages by members in 1814, and
the columns of the Religious Telescope, the denominational
newspaper, reflected this point of view.^
Otterbein University faculty felt that the institution was the
main reason for the existence of the village and that students
should not be exposed to such temptations. Publicity emphasized
that the village was free of saloons and immorality.® President
Henry A. Thompson was a leader in temperance circles in the
state and ran for Vice-President of the United States on the
Prohibition ticket in 1880.^ Mrs. John Haywood, wife of a faculty
member, was the first president of the village WCTU.^® In retro
spect, Professor Henry Garst considered Otterbein University had
‘borne a leading part in securing and maintaining the best that
has been attained ui on the aubject of temperance in the government of the place.
Who was Corbin? He was not unfamiliar with the village,
having once conducted a hardware business there. He was so
obsessed with the idea of establishing a saloon in the village
that one newspaper believed that his mind was “hazed.” Tall,
extremely slender, with eyes set far back in his head, he looked
like an invalid. In his ears he wore small, round gold rings. His
wife, Phyloxena, was the more vigorous of the two. A volatile
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talker, she made her displeasure known to those whom she sus
pected of vandalizing her husband’s saloon. An assistant who
sometimes tended bar was nicknamed “Barefoot.”
Corbin underestimated the resistance that he would encounter.
Before he made his first sale, delegations of men and of women
separately tried to persuade him to abandon the attempt.^^ During
the night of June 30, 1875, someone entered his place of busi
ness, emptied demijohns of whiskey and bored holes in the beer
kegs, but the proprietor managed to secure a new supply from
Columbus for his grand opening at nine o’clock in the morning on
July 1.14
A few minutes later, college, church and fire bells rang. By
prearrangement the members of the new fire company dashed to
positions before the saloon, as if it were ablaze, and a crowd of
1,000 persons gathered. Expecting violence, Corbin flourished
two “horse pistols” and swore to defend his establishment
against all comers. But the only weapons used were words and
reason. Clergymen, faculty members and townspeople spoke,
hymns were sung and prayers offered. Corbin informed the spec
tators that he had the right under state law to engage in this
business and promised to keep an orderly place in which he would
serve only the “purest and most wholesome of liquors.”^^
Before dispersing, the crowd appointed a Vigilance Committee
of 25 men, which then assembled in the Presbyterian Church. The
women of the community met separately in the Methodist Church.
The Vigilance Committee arranged for a series of mass meetings
to unify feeling, raised pledges of S5,000 to prosecute the saloon
keeper, and sent a delegation to ask the owner to abandon the
enterprise. The committee circulated a Citizen’s Pledge, which
read:
We, the undersigned, citizens of Westerville and vicinity,
hereby solemnly pledge ourselves that we will not patronize
any dry-goods merchant, groceryman, physician, lawyer,
mechanic, or any other business man, or employ for any
purpose a laboring man or hire help that will frequent, en
courage, sustain, or furnish aid to a liquor saloon in Wester
ville.

Eventually 637 signatures were secured.Professor Garst be
lieved that all but a score of voters signed the document, though
one reported declared that it included the names of some juve
niles and 255 women.
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Thus far the resistance to having a saloon in Westerville had
been confined to orderly means, except for the destruction of
Corbin’s liquor and beer, but now a lawless element, perhaps
aroused by emotional denunciations at mass meetings, took over.
Even before Corbin opened his doors, rotten eggs were thrown at
the building.^® On the night of July 1, the saloon was stoned
and its windows broken. The ladies then tried “a dose of Cru
sade” by singing and praying with the owner, as their friends at
Hillsboro had done in a similar situation, but the saloonkeeper’s
heart did not soften.
On July 6 came the first of a series of explosions. About 1:30
in the morning a loud noise startled the residents. An explosion
had burned a hole in the floor of the east room, blown out win
dows and loosened stone caps above them, and raised the roof
four inches.
Were the perpetrators the proprietor himself or an irrespon
sible element willing to use any means to rid the village of the
nuisance? Contending that Corbin’s motive was to collect insur
ance or to be reimbursed by the Brewers’ Association in Colum
bus, President Thompson believed that the saloonkeeper was
responsible and pointed out that bottles within the saloon re
mained unbroken. The press claimed that the structure was
uninsured and suggested that extremists in the temperance group
were responsible. This division of opinion as to the guilty party
persisted in subsequent explosions.^^
Explosion and a fire, which some suspected of being set by
an arsonist, did $500 worth of damage to the west room on July 11.
Another report was that the fire resulted from a lamp being
knocked over by one of Corbin’s drunken guards.The Vigilance
Committee posted sentries at the doors to note who entered and
to watch for violations of law.After his doorposts were smeared
with filth, Corbin fixed a loaded musket aimed at the door to
protect the saloon at night.
A second explosion occurred ‘‘like a loud cannon peal” at
nine o’clock in the evening of August 3 shortly after Corbin had
left the saloon. The people of the village assembled for a tem
perance meeting in the Methodist Church were startled, and one
lady in the audience fainted. The west end of the building was
damaged, and the roof raised several inches.^ ^ President
Thompson suspected that the perpetrator was the saloonist. He
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believed that Corbin expected someone to rush into the building
immediately after the incident and to be killed by the cocked
musket fastened by a rope to the door. The proprietor still con
tinued to dispense beer and liquor at the bar. ^
A week later a third explosion again damaged the east room
in which the first explosion had occurred. Explosive material had
been placed under the beer cooler in this room through an iron
grating in the foundation. Portions of the north and east walls
caved in, allowing one part of the roof to rest on the ground. A
reporter, described the barroom as “a total wreck.” The west
room was in almost as bad a condition, and visitors feared to
tarry there for fear that it might cave in. The proprietor continued
undaunted to sell beer and whiskey in a small room in the rear
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built as a kitchen.
During these months Corbin and the community engaged in a
series of court battles. The village fathers amended the ordinance
of 1859 on July 13, 1875, to prohibit sales to minors and intoxi
cated persons and for consumption on the premises. This local
ordinance also fixed the hour of closing at eight o’clock.
Corbin fought back by accusing seven prominent citizens of
inciting a riot by assembling a mob at his opening. The list of
names included the pastors of the Presbyterian and Methodist
churches, the postmaster and four businessmen. A delegation of
two hundred citizens in three special railway cars accompanied
these men to Columbus for trial on July 7 before an unsympathetic
German judge in the Common Pleas Court. At the Union Depot
under the marshallship of President Thompson, they formed a
procession and marched in almost military fashion to the Justice s
office. The defendants were released under bond.^^
After the proceedings were over, Corbin, alleging that his life
was in danger and his property in jeopardy, had warrants sworn
out against the pastors of the Methodist and Presbyterian
churches, three United Brethren clergymen, and four other resi
dents of Westerville. On July 8, sixty persons accompanied these
men to the Court of Common Pleas. They were released under
bond.^^

Accused of keeping his saloon open after eight o’clock,
Corbin demanded a jury trial in the Westerville Mayor s Court.
His attorneys then asked the prospective members embarrassing
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questions about whether they had signed the Citizen’s Pledge,
their attitude towards temperance, and what they knew about the
destruction of Corbin’s property. The effort to select jurors took
a long time; for the first time a Negro served on a jury in the
village. When Corbin could not pay the costs, his stock of liquor
was confiscated. After doubts were expressed about the legality
of the village ordinance, his bottles were returned to him.^^
Corbin continued in business for a short time thereafter, but
finally gave up the attempt.
Four years later Corbin bought for $4,000 the Clymer House,
containing twenty rooms. (Today the site is the location of the
Westerville Theatre on State Street.) Here L. D. Green opened a
saloon and billiard room in the basement in the fall of 1878, but
public sentiment was so much opposed that he gave up the two
enterprises in the spring of 1879. Corbin then operated the saloon.
He expressed the opinion that no one would blow up the Corbin
Hotel, for if it went, so would the rest of the business district,
On September 15, 1879, at two o’clock in the morning, an
explosion shook the town with earthquake violence. The noise
was heard seven or eight miles away. The theft of two 26-pound
kegs of gunpowder from a shed owned by a local merchant re
vealed the means. The hotel was made uninhabitable, as severe
damage was done to every room, to the walls and to the roof. The
house of Mrs. Barkeefer next door suffered so much damage that
it was considered unrepairable. Glass windows within a hundred
yards were broken. Estimated damage to Corbin’s Hotel totaled
$2,500 and to the adjacent dwelling, $5,000.It seemed miraculous
that none of the ten persons sleeping in the hotel received more
than minor scratches, with the exception of Corbin. By the force
of the blast he had been thrown out of bed. He lost two front
teeth, received two severe head wounds, and was knocked into
unconsciousness.^^
Rumors circulated that five men had been seen running from
the scene a short time before the explosion. Some persons sus.pected Corbin as the perpetrator because no one in the hotel had
been seriously injured, the rugs in the front rooms had been
rolled up and stored elsewhere, and his young son had supposedly
mentioned that the family was in the backyard at the time of the
explosion.
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Citizens responded indignantly to accusations that they had
again taken the law into their own hands. The village council
offered a reward of $300 for the arrest and conviction of the per
son or persons responsible, and hired a private detective to
ferret out the culprit in a secret session. A mass meeting con
demned the act of violence and raised $300 to supplement the
reward offered by councilmen.^^
Some people thought that Otterbein University and the United
Brethren Church were responsible for the explosion. Rumors
spread that Corbin sympathizei:s might burn down a college build
ing. Cancellation of insurance policies by companies issuing
them seemed a possibility. To make clear the attitude of respon
sible college officials, a meeting chaired by Professor John
Haywood with Professor Henry Garst as secretary condemned the
method used to put Corbin out of business.Professor Haywood
also presided over the quarterly conference of the United Breth
ren Church of Otterbein Station which denounced the violence.
Corbin announced that he would continue his saloon, but his
own building was wrecked, and no one dared to risk the destruc
tion of property by renting to him. On charges brought by a private
detective, he was brought before the Mayor’s Court for malicious
destruction of his own property. The evidence was inconclusive
and contradictory, and he was acquitted.^®
A children’s story published in 1923 in the Watchword, a
denominational magazine, presented an explanation for the blow
ing up of Corbin’s saloon in 1879. When an Otterbein student
found his roommate drunk after having purchased liquor at this
establishment, he was so indignant that he undertook its demoli
tion. He was rewarded by witnessing the conversion of his friend
and his entrance into the ministry. The writer has not been able
to establish the validity of the story.
Resistance to Corbin’s effort to operate a saloon in Wester
ville raises some interesting constitutional questions, some of
which are currently relevant. Does an irresponsible element
possess the right to demonstrate its displeasure by acts of
violence? Assuming that the saloon was blown up by members of
the community other than the proprietor himself, what responsibil
ity do members of the community have who know the names of
the perpetrators? What responsibility does a college have to
protect its students from bad and immoral influences? What role
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should the church and its leaders play in protecting the members
of its congregation and the community from evil influences? Why
did 1 ocal and state authorities not take a more active part in
seeking out the violators of state law? Was it partly because the
acts of violence represented concensus opinion in the community?
While almost everyone in Westerville opposed the saloon —
President Thompson estimated ninety-nine hundreds of the resi
dents — the people in 1875 were not agreed as to the means of
putting Corbin out of business.Isaac Speer, who with his wife
had been in charge of Saum Hall dormitory and a guard at the door
of the saloon, summarized these points of view in a letter to the
Religious Telescope. One group of citizens was willing to depend
on local and state laws. Eventually if Corbin was harassed
sufficiently, he would relinquish the business. A large class of
citizens advocated moral suasion. These were the people who
had signed the Citizen’s Pledge. Another element would use
rotten eggs, tar and feathers, gunpowder and hemp cord as potent
weapons. In any case Speer thought that the people of the village
were determined to fight it out if it took all summer."^^
These attitudes were reflected in the press. One citizen
expressed concern over the seizure of the reins of government by
the Vigilance Committee and at the acts of violence. He feared
that the reputation of Westerville as a quiet, peaceful law-abiding
village might be forever lost. He concluded:
Let the fair fame of our village be preserved and our
reputation as law abiding cftizens be untarnished. Redress
our grievances by the law of kindness and through the
ballot box; any violation of law is riot, discord, disgrace —
and a failure to accomplish the object at which we aim.^^

The cynical editor of the Ohio State Journal pointed out that if
Christ had come to Westerville and had drunk wine with the
publican, Corbin, he, too, might have been arrested.
Another correspondent from Westerville in 1875 also ex
pressed concern over the means employed to put Corbin out of
business. He warned that the mob that winks today at the destruc
tion of the saloonkeeper’s property might turn tomorrow to attack
someone because he was a Catholic, a Protestant, a member of a
secret society, or a voter who supported an unpopular candidate.
He saw a parallel to the case of a financial agent of Otterbein
University (William Slaughter), who, contrary to the doctrine of
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the United Brethren Church, joined the Masons in 1857. Sub
sequently under pressure from the church and the community, he
found it desirable to resign from the position and to sell his
drygoods business. Controversy split the denomination, the
enrollment of the college fell by half, and the institution neared
dying from ‘‘convulsions/’ But the mob had triumphed and had
its way. The correspondent believed that three-fourths of the
citizens of Blendon Township endorsed the attitude of the Ohio
State Journal in favor of law and order rather than for irregular
control by a Vigilance Committee.
The editor of the Ohio State Journal in 1875 saw danger in
the motto accepted by many residents of the village. Anything
to clean out Corbin.”He feared that the “inflammatory character”
of the speeches at mass meetings encouraged “irresponsible
depredators” to engage in vandalism. He cited the example of a
local minister who advised an audience that Corbin and his place
of business were outlawed, and therefore, he, for one, would
stand aside if it were rotten egged or destroyed. The Ohio State
Journal summarized this speech as saying, “Go in, boys; we
won’t interfere with you.” A reporter described similar speeches
by other community leaders.
The Westerville Whiskey Wars, as they were labeled by the
press in 1875, even drew national attention. The Independent^ a
New York magazine, criticized the method used to put Corbin out
of business. The perpetrators aimed at a noble object, but used
bad means. If the facts were as reported, the periodical believed
that the saloonkeeper should be protected in his rights as a
citizen and the temp-erance rioters should be punished.^ The
Religious Telescope lambasted the editor of the Independent and
blamed the explosions on “some irresponsible parties, if not the
saloonist himself.”"*^
President Henry A. Thompson of Otterbein University was
adamant that the saloon must be closed. In the Religious Tele
scope, in an interview, and in speeches at mass meetings, he
emphasized that the community was determined to have no
saloons, and that ''cost what it may, they (the people of the
community) will not have them.” He pointed out that Westerville
was not simply fighting its own battle, but was engaged in a
struggle on behalf of the state and nation. By the middle of
August, 1875, he believed that the saloon had been for all
intents and purposes closed, since its quarters were reduced
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to a little, pitiful hole so fragrant with the odor of rotten eggs
that patrons stayed out unless they had the stomach of a horse.
Even the dogs would not enter, but remained outside barking. He
described the owners as “a lean, half-beast man and a more
devilish woman.
Faculty members at Otterbein University agreed with the point
of view e3q)ressed by their President. In a mass meeting one
professor declared that the business must be stopped, even if
the building had to be torn down brick by brick. His wife advised
the men in one mass meeting to take care of Corbin, and the
women would look after his wife. Faculty members participated
in train rides to Columbus to support citizens accused of inciting
a riot.^^
A village resident in 1875 took a similar stand. After a lengthy
review of the situation, he asked petulantly:
Can we not have one community in our common country,
one oasis in all this land, one quiet retreat in this home of
the free, where the sacredness of the Christian Sabbath,
the quiet of the domestic circle, and the solemnities of the
sanctuary will not be disturbed by the fruits of the, dram
shop, the liquor traffic and the house of debauchery? . . .
Is there no retreat, no respite from this piping monster
that is destroying its thousands annually?^^

Did Corbin destroy his own property in 1875? His opponents
accused him of acts of vandalism and of blowing up his saloon.
They pointed out that the explosions did not damage his whiskey
and beer. President Thompson believed that the first explosion
was “a set-up job by the proprietor himself, and that it was done
to secure sympathy for him, and to stigmatize his opposers.” The
property was mortgaged, he alleged, and Corbin’s wife claimed
that they had money promised to build another saloon.
What would be Corbin’s motive in destroying uninsured
property? Isaac Speer believed that his reasons were to create
.sympathy outside of the community and to try to secure compen
sation from the villeige council. Others thought that he would be
paid for his loss by the brewery industry in Columbus.In
retrospect, the reasons assigned to him for destroying his own
business are very feeble, and it seems unlikely that he was
responsible.
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The same sort of rumors circulated in 1879, but a jury did not
find him guilty of blowing up his own property because of con
flicting and contradictory evidence.The Religious Telescope
printed a report that “the whole thing was the work of the saloonist himself, just as previously he had done the same thing, in
order to cast odium upon the temperance work, and, if possible,
secure money from his whiskey friends.” Professor Garst agreed
with this point of view.^"^
The explosion in 1879 also attracted national attention. A
correspondent of the New York Times expressed one point of
view in a telegraphic dispatch which appeared on the front page.
He declared, “It is ascertained beyond question that the outrage
was planned and executed by certain people in the village who
were determined to rid the place of a saloon regardless of what
means wereused.”^^
Agreeing somewhat with this stand, the editor of the Wester
ville Review believed that any attempt to fix the act on any
organization, party or church or the temperance people was
“entirely unwarranted,” but that it might have been accomplished
“by a few fanatical members of some of them is not improb
able.”^^ The writer agrees with this point of view, and thinks it
unlikely that Corbin destroyed his own property.
To this day the names of the persons who blew up Corbin’s
saloon have not become public knowledge, though some older
residents hint that they know the answer.
Incidents of citizens taking the law into their own hands to
express a point of view have numerous precedents in American
history. Residents of Boston threw tea into their harbor on the
eve of the American Revolution, vigilante committees operated
on mining frontiers and in western towns, and the Ku-Klux-Klan
by its activities after the Civil War paved the way for the assump
tion of control by white persons in the South. Recently blacks
and white sympathizers have demonstrated on behalf of civil
rights for Negroes, and students have rioted on campuses. Law
and the constitution does not favor such procedures, but the
perpetrators of the explosions were part of the stream of Ameri
can history in doing their thing in Westerville in 1875 and 1879.
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0. Amos

THE NEW BLACK MOOD
Winsom Amos has written two novels, several prose works,
and poetry. For the past four or five years he has written almost
exclusively about the “new black mood.’*
His latest works, like those of many contemporary black
artists, depict the increased pride, self-worth, and self-determina
tion which are observable in black peoples of the world. His
writing also strikes out at contradictions, hypocrisy, and inhu
maneness so widespread in society today. A compilation of
several of his works called Oriole to Black Mood will be pub
lished in 1973. One poem that will appear in the 1973 publication,
“Sit Perk and Label Me,” is presented below:

SIT PERK AND LABEL ME
Sit perk in your suitable homes
on Covenant street.
Say I’m from the slum,
living in poverty
and very poor.
Sit perk, oppress me
economically and politically.
Bar doors to the system.
Then label me culturally disadvantaged
and deprived from lower class.
Sit perk; cast me forcefully
to the slum school.
Say I’m a slow learner
or mentally retarded.
And plan for me ‘head start’.
Sit perk amidst the struggle
of wealthy against poor,
of the poor hopelessly against the rich,
the poor needy and the rich greedy
generating an endless paranoia.
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Sit perk and price yourselves
into bankruptcy
and tear yourselves apart,
trying to crush my aspirations
with keep-the-poor-out house prices
Sit perk, suburbanites, but remember .
the labels you hang on me
might be yours someday
when and if you should fall
and must leave Covenant street.
— Winsom Amos
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James Winkates

CONCEPTS OF CHANGE: CAUSE AND RESPONSE
In order to manage change, and certainly to channel or control
its effects, one must change himself. By definition to change is
to alter, vary, modify, substitute or replace values. Because
values are acquired largely through hard experience, human
beings discover that to change is often difficult. Having admitted
the difficulty, one finds however that there is little choice. In
this sense, a refusal to alter, modify or replace some of our
values is self-defeating, even if it is occasionally possible.
Examine for a moment a few of the examples of change offered
by Alvin Toffler (Future Shock) and others. In the United States,
certainly, the greater portion of our labor force is no longer
engaged in primary and secondary industries. We are no longer
hunters, farmers and fishermen. Indeed, we are no longer essen
tially engaged in manufacturing and product production. Rather,
most of the current labor force finds employment or self-employ
ment in service-related occupations, Americans have in fact
exploded into the post-industrial society.
Mechanized farming and agrobusiness in large part have
replaced the typically small, family owned farm. The assembly
line, now computerized, routinely fashions engine blocks, the
tools to repair them, and can even design new tools for as yet
unthought of applications. These few changes alone have man
dated further change for those who formerly found their livelihood
in these skills.
As a direct result of the migration of American society from
primary industries to tertiary or service-related occupations, the
typical American has become more mobile as well. A recent
governmental study noted that an average family makes seventeen
moves of residence in a normal lifetime. Mobility then also
affects and changes our values. The rise in production levels
has meant the creation of more leisure and recreation time. Many
citizens now live in modular housing, own disposable clothing,
and buy or rent inflatable furniture for their home. Commuters will
shortly travel to work on computerized traffic systems and
conveyor-like thruways. And in the not-too-distant future some of
us will no doubt live in underground cities, nourished by artifi37

cial sunlight, “eating” pills and concentrated foods in lieu of
flavored, colored and crunchy staples.
What more does the imminent future hold? There will be
families in large numbers who choose to have no children. Those
with children will have their own school in the home through the
use of telescreens. We could communicate by ESP and modes
other than speech. Education will be capsulized, programmed,
easily accessible for all, child and adult alike. Solid waste will
be recycled into mulch and landfill for home and landscape use.
Even new forms of corpse disposal will come about because of
the dire need for landuse for betterment of society. Solar power,
fusion energy and heat transfer processes will have replaced
fossil fuels. Family vacations may be interplanetary or even
galactic rather than local or continental. If it is an age of chaos
or war, some people or whole families may decide to freeze
themselves in suspended animation to re-emerge at a more
propitious time. Medical advances now underway will provide us
with organ bank rentals and organ factories to replace our worn
out parts. The aged will be our living history books. When indivi
duals choose to die they may be replaced by a twin in physical
structure as a result of the cloning process. Three, four or five
sequential careers could be common.
Some of these changes are of course only dimly seen at this
point in time. A few may be unacceptable and thereby avoided.
All, nevertheless, are at least feasible in the next generation. A
few more are already in pilot stage, with still others quite likely
to occur. None are improbable. There are more important factors
for us to consider in the mid twentieth-century, however, than an
examination of which ones will come about and which ones will
not. On the contrary, what is critically important is how we will
respond to systemic and value change. Some measure of our
future response can be determined from the nature of human
response to change today.
Coping Stances and Processes
The human being in all his glorious diversity perhaps resorts
to as many coping mechanisms as there are changes with which
to cope. As Toffler maintains, the chief social challenge will not
be a scarcity of choice or options but rather overchoice, a ple
thora of alternatives. One will be concerned increasingly with
the selection and allocation of values rather than with the crea
tion of resources. However, even today in the midst of rampant
38

change our coping processes have been outdistanced by the
nature, frequency, and intensity of change itself. As a result,
man has opted to avoid, accept only partially, or trade off the
changes about him. The variety of response can perhaps be
suggested through a delineation of persons adopting certain
coping “stances :
1. the opter-outer
2. the piece-mealer
3. the compromiser
4. the exchanger or trader
5. the illusion-creator
6. the warrior or challenger
With perhaps some exceptions, none of the above have learned to
control the rate of change. At best they have avoided it, skated
around it, walked through it, but they have not really confronted
its substance nor its vicious pace.
When change or its accelerated pace overwhelms us we cry,
swear, get drunk, return to a womb-like abandon, resort to prayer,
pop pills, take a vacation, get observed in a hospital, see a
shrink or, in desperation, end our existence. The highest suicide
rate has traditionally occurred in those societies considered
most advanced and in those age groups where pressures, respon
sibilities and expectations are the greatest.
By refraining from envisioning our future, by avoiding the need
for planning, by escaping to eras and themes past (i.e. our pres
ent nostalgia fixation) we condemn ourselves to past and present.
Unless we find new ways of adapting to rapid change, both
substantively and emotionally, we are headed for a massive
societal breakdown. The conclusion, if one is apparent, is that
to regulate change, we must change all the more.
A Look at Crisis Management
A crisis is a turning point, a decisive moment or a crucial
time in a given situation. We are no doubt quite familiar with
personal crises — a death in the immediate family, a child’s
broken arm, or a fire in our home. Similarly, not by direct exper
ience,- but through the media, we are acquainted with or at least
aware of international crises. But what is a community crisis, a
vital turning point for a town?

It certainly can be viewed as a potential breakdown of a
micro system. Crisis, like its parent, change, is both potentially
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positive and negative. A certain amount and level of crisis is a
sign of a community on the move. The secret, however, is how to
control the frequency and the intensity of crisis.
The question of how to control the frequency and intensity of
crisis ultimately comes to an even more basic question — how do
we man-age change? No easy answers or panaceas are obvious,
but one can at least approach a response to that question ration
ally and systematically.
Such a systematic attack may be outlined as follows: motiva
tion, information, activation and followup. Let us look at the
elements of this “action route.”
Motivation
— Internalize and “accept” as a starting point the changes
which have already taken place
■— Demonstrate interest in your neighborhood and your com
munity
— Make time for community affairs and take some responsibil
ity and initiatives
— Care. enough to criticize, revise, add to or complement
views expressed by other members of the community
— Remain prepared for and anticipate change
Information
— Get the facts and listen to the opposing arguments
— Make sure you are getting accurate information, not just
opinions, expressed fears, and rumors
— Evaluate the facts, arguments and opinions in order to move
toward a position or decision
— Remind yourself and others that what may be in the town’s
best interest will not always be in the self-interest of
some citizens
Activation
— Communicate accurate and adequate information to others
in the community
— Get involved on issues and community problems and involve
others too
— Be willing to serve on city task forces, committees, etc.
— Move your community group, neighborhood or organization to
act on important community issues
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Followup
— Evaluate how well community leaders and decision-makers
do. their job
— Give them support when it is due and justified
—.Let them know when you think, on the basis of sound
evidence, they are wrong or unconcerned
— Help create an atmosphere for adaptation to change
Summing Up
This “action route” will not eliminate crisis nor should we
want to prevent all crises. At the same time we must control the
frequency of crisis and limit its intensity. That is best done by
anticipating change and planning for it.

A community, like man, ■ grows and matures through hard
experience and crisis management. Too few crises or changes
and we become stagnant. Too many crises and we are over
whelmed because our adaptive mechanisms cannot cope or
respond quickly enough. To re-emphasize an earlier observation,
in order to regulate change we must change all the more.
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James R. Bailey

A VILLAGE LIFE: EDITH WHARTON’S SUMMER
The fiction of Edith Wharton is more closely identified with
urban surroundings and characters than with those of American
villages, but two notable exceptions in which Mrs. Wharton
utilized her observations of rural New England life are the short
novels, Ethan Frame (1911) and Summer (1917). The former, an
artfully told story of a farmer, is well known; the latter, a tale of
a rebellious girl in a Massachusetts hamlet, deserves more fame
than it has won. Just as in Frame’s story the novelist has made
from the “local color” elements a taut, moving tragedy of ruined
lives, so in Summer she has eventually wrought of the sparse
materials of a rural village a sympathetic account of the coming
of age of a young woman whose emotional and intellectual
capacities have been stunted since childhood.
Judging from the author’s later comments in her memoir,
A Backward Glance, it was a few episodes that finally are rather
insignificant for plot and theme that led her to write Summer.
These are episodes dealing with a group of social outcasts who
have settled on “the Mountain” which is situated close to the
village. North Dormer. It was in these somewhat melodramatic
scenes, among the most repugnant ever composed by Mrs.
Wharton, as well as in the bleak portrayal of life in North Dormer,
that the novelist sought to darken the too rosy fictional impres
sion of rural New England that she thought was rendered in other
fiction.I
But because in the novel itself Mrs. Wharton consistently
focuses upon the youthful protagonist. Charity Royall, the
regionalism and the specific social criticism are soon eclipsed
by the drama of the young woman’s efforts to escape the monotony
and pettiness of North Dormer and, more importantly, by the
drama of her halting inward growth that may lessen the constric
tive effects of village life. Indeed, although perhaps Mrs.
Wharton’s original impulse was to pen an expose" of the dreary,
and even sensational, elements in a New England village —
including illegitimacy and incest — the novel eventually empha
sizes not the deleterious results of rural life but the new,
invigorating emotional responses that are fostered in Charity
through her misfortunes and that are necessary before she can
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achieve an equilibrium in which she may find a satisfying life.
It is also to the benefit of the novel’s artistry that Mrs,
Wharton has not merely documented a narrow determinism in which
unalterable forces threaten to overwhelm or undermine a charac
ter’s efforts; in this characterization — one more tinged with
compassion than many of her other treatments of American women
— Mrs. Wharton always suggests the complex causes that are
operating. Charity is presented as a living, developing, and
flawed human being, not as an embodiment of a theory nor as a
subject in a controlled experiment.
The deprivations endured by the villagers, however, are
emphasized by Mrs. Wharton in the description of North Dormer.
It is a. one-street town, its inhabitants undernourished in all
ways. Their chief distraction from drudgery is gossip, and they
seem to remain there because of ignorance and inertia or, as in
the case of the middle-aged lawyer Royall, because of personal
failure elsewhere.
Charity, who is in her late teens and has dwelt for as long as
she can remember in the village as the ward of Royall and his
late wife, anticipates a day when she can be free of her guard
ian’s control and the village’s tedium. Accordingly, she has
acquired a job, with the lawyer’s help, for which, untrained and
undisciplined as she is, she is particularly unsuited. She pre
sides over the community’s dismal library, but since she dislikes
reading and scarcely tolerates the other villagers, she is nearly
as dissatisfied, as before.
Disturbed by doubts about her birth and miserable in her
present circumstances. Charity Royall is a quietly bitter young
woman as the summer of the novel commences. About her parents
she knows only that they were among the renegade mountaineers
and that she is expected to be grateful to Royall for having
rescued her as a child. The lawyer has offered no explanation of
her past, and she has shrunk from hearing him reveal her shame.
Little communication has existed between the girl and Royall,
even while his wife lived, and in the years since Mrs. Royall’s
death Charity has developed a genuine antipathy toward Royall,
a lonely, undemonstrative man who tries to fill his personal void
by reading oratory and by occasionally indulging himself in
debauchery in the closest town, Nettleton. The girl’s glimmering
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pity has been extinguished when he, in an unguarded moment,
has made a sexual advance, an advance immediately followed by
a marriage proposal. Her compassion turned to contempt. Charity
sneers at Royall and is not above using his weakness against
him. Although Mrs. Wharton always encourages the reader to
respond sympathetically to the girl’s plight, she also details the
blemishes in the portrait.
Her self-doubts, her upbringing in which affection has been
extraordinary, and her frustrated aspirations all have conspired
to make Charity an unpleasant human being. The novelist pro
vides the keynote in the girl’s opening statement: “How I hate
everything!”^ Her experiences and her drab surroundings evoke
only distrust and dislike,It is also established from the beginning
that a solution, if possible, will not be nearly so simple as
Charity thinks. An exodus from North Dormer is not going to bring
her the prompt happiness that she expects, for her interior land
scape is as bleak and unpromising as the village scene. At this
point Charity is so restricted emotionally that a new environment
is likely to result in only more dissatisfaction. Charity’s dilemma,
of course, is compounded by the fact that she is imprisoned by
bonds that she can only dimly perceive.
In at least one respect this characterization resembles other
young American women in Mrs. Wharton’s fiction. As an illformed, under-developed personality. Charity shares with the
Midwestern social climber Undine Spragg, in The Custom of the
Country, and the fashionable New Yorker Lily Bart, in The House
of Mirth, a terrible shallowness, a lack of any inner resources.
Like these two from quite disparate backgrounds. Charity, at
first, is sustained only by dreams of romantic love and material
improvement. In all three heroines lies an implicit criticism, a
suggestion that American society offers its women, whether of
the village or the city, whether poor or well-to-do, little real
education and few opportunities to find satisfying lives.3
It is noteworthy, too, that by the end of Summer this limited
village girl has achieved more self-knowledge, in terms of
increased consciousness and new, favorable responses both to
herself and others, than do either of these earlier protagonists
whose opportunities are much richer. Charity’s successes, which
ultimately are ironic, depend upon a flexibility that the other two
protagonists cannot or will not discover within themselves.
Charity Royall belongs to the company of Wharton’s seekers,
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such as Newland Archer of The Age of Innocence and Anna Leath
of The Reef, who cultivate inner resiliency while agreeing to
accept less in life than they sought.
In her confused adolescence Charity’s dominant — and illusory
— quest is for love with Lucius Harney, an outsider, a young
architect, and a cousin of North Dormer’s first citizen. Although
the couple feels a mutual attraction when they meet in June, each
observes the social and cultural gulf. As Charity aids Harney in
locating old homes to sketch, they become companions but remain
careful not to overstep the bounds of friendship and stray toward
a physical intimacy. But, partly because of the opposition of
Royall, who is both wary and jealous of the younger man, the
friendship does ripen into a passionate, sexual love. In August
when Harney leaves North Dormer, he promises, again because of
Royall’s intervention, to “try” to return to marry Charity.
Although she has exacted no promise from her lover, she cher
ishes a hope that he will return. The crisis ensues when she
learns first that Harney is already engaged to a girl of his own
rank, and then that she is pregnant.
Although Mrs. Wharton has taken a staple of romantic fiction
for the plot of Summer, she has developed this version of mis
matched lovers and a watchful guardian with unforced realism.
Neither a village Romeo and Juliet nor a story of provincial
innocence seduced and abandoned by urban sophistication, the
love story is instead a straightforward narrative that emphasizes
a youthful sexual awakening.
Certainly Mrs. Wharton’s treatment of sexual love is muted in
comparison with scenes written by later novelists; however, in
Summer she emphasizes from the first the sexual magnetism
drawing the couple together. Throughout this novel she writes of
sex with an openness that challenges the notion of her as a
prudish bluestocking.At their initial meeting Charity senses
that Harney finds her sexually attractive, and she responds with
a private fantasy about him. A little later, when she fears that
Royall’s envy will separate them, she thinks of using sex to
bind the youth to her; but remembering other country girls who
have ensnared husbands, she proudly rejects such self-exploita
tion. Charity’s honesty about sex, and especially her refusal to
traffic in it for selfish ends, is an important trait in the charac
terization.
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In writing of this youthful love that flowers during the waning
summer, Mrs. Wharton carefully refrains from any authorial moral
judgment. Instead of commenting, she lyrically describes the
effects of love upon Charity.
The only reality was the wondrous unfolding of her new
self, the reaching out to the light of all her contracted
tendrils. She had lived all her life among people whose
sensibilities seemed to have withered for lack of use; and
more wonderful, at first, than Harney’s endearments were
the words that were a part of them. She had always thought
of love as something confused and furtive, and he made it
as bright and open as the summer air.^.

Any questions as to the general morality of premarital sex are
put aside; in this case the girl who did hate everything about her
life is clearly striding forward emotionally. The sexual relation
ship with Harney allows Charity to express openly newly dis
covered feelings, love and trust, and to give freely of herself
while asking only affection in return.
Judgments, about sexual morality are not posited by the
characters nor directly by Mrs. Wharton; however, the physical
and emotional consequences that Charity is left to face alone
force her to re-evaluate her ecstatic reaction to love. Even
before Harney returns to New York, the girl begins to assess the
personal cost of the love affair when she suspects that her lover
has been dishonest about himself. She wonders about the actual
equality of a relationship which seems inevitably to exact a
greater price from the woman.
She had given him all she had — but what was it compared
to the other gifts life held for him? She understood now the
case of girls like herself to whom this kind of thing
happened. They gave all they had, but their all was not
enough: it could not buy more than a few moments .... 6

Charity’s suspicion, that her proffered love is insufficient to
compete with Harney’s career and his need for a wife comple
mentary to his rank and ambition, is soon confirmed. When she
writes and offers to release Harney from his promise, she
receives a vague, but reticent and grateful reply. Although the
disparity between the price of sexual liberty for the male and
female is now inescapable for Charity, she does not write to
Harney about her pregnancy. Apparently the very fact that she
can compel Harney to return to her prevents her from employing
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that power.
Charity, who has been characterized by pride and independence
throughout, recoils from the obvious choices for an unwed,
pregnant girl in North Dormer. She wants neither to be ridiculed
by her neighbors as a shotgun bride nor to be ostracized as an
unmarried mother. A third alternative, abortion. Charity does not
seriously consider although an extremely disreputable woman
physician is handily available in Nettleton.^ Another course, to
ask Royall for advice or aid, is ignored by the girl, for she still
distrusts him and unjustly thinks that he will be elated at her
dilemma. Her immediate reaction, based on a highly unrealistic
hope, is to seek refuge among the outcasts on the Mountain.
Charity’s delusion, that she may discover a new identity
among her mountain kin and that she may even be reclaimed by
a loving mother, is contrary to all that the girl knows about these
people. Moreover, she has finally heard from Royall that her own
parents were a convict and a sluttish derelict. Still, lured on by
her false hope. Charity arrives at the mountain settlement in the
company of the minister who has been sent for to attend a dying
woman. The drunken squalor and the subhuman behavior of the
mountaineers as they bury a wasted corpse. Charity’s own mother,
drive the girl away.
It is consistent with Mrs, Wharton’s realistic characterization
of the village girl that in the final episodes Charity must accom
modate herself to actuality and respond to the help offered by
her one remaining friend. Descending the Mountain and resolving
to go away, Charity encounters Royall, who has come for her.
Without reproach he renews his marriage offer, and she, not
telling of her pregnancy, passively allows him to wed her that
same day. Of course, Royall has already surmised her secret,
and they arrive at a tacit understanding and a mutual trust with
neither professing love. Their avowals are simply an admission
that the other is a “good” person.
Mrs. Wharton wisely makes no effort to establish the middleaged lawyer as a deus ex machina to provide a neat solution to
the heroine’s problems. This logical, unromantic ending has been
prepared for throughout the narrative, since Royall’s desire to
marry the girl has been established from the first, and his con
tinuing interest has been testified to at each turn of Charity’s
and Harney’s relationship. Certainly the girl’s acceptance of her
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middle-aged lover does not provide an arbitrary happy ending,
nor even an especially tidy one. Charity’s immediate crisis is
resolved. The kind of edifice she and her husband will erect
upon the foundation of mutual need is left to the reader s imagi
nation.
Despite the difficulties implicit in this wedding of May and
January, the ending of Summer does have its optimism. There is
the possibility that the couple can arrive at a mutually satisfying
life. First of all, they are not bound economically to village life;
they can leave North Dormer if they choose to escape its re
straints and gossip. Of greater importance is the fact that each
is capable of ministering to the most urgent needs of the other.
The isolated lawyer needs a sympathetic companion, and the
girl, having recognized the depth of his feeling and the extent of
his devotion, can begin to respond to his need. Her immediate
wishes — security and protection for herself and her baby — can
be met by Royall, who despite his shortcomings does possess a
patient and tender heart. Also, he can provide intellectual
companionship, a need that Charity is only beginning to feel.
Finally their marriage of convenience seems more likely to
endure than could the passionate idyll of Charity and Harney.
Structurally the conclusion is highly ironic: Summer ends with
Charity returning to North Dormer and now married to the man
whom she most distrusted. However, in terms of characterization
and the novel’s themes, the ending is to be judged as a personal
victory for the heroine. Her acceptance of Royall’s love and her
admission of his goodness are evidence of the emotional enlarge
ment that began with Harney and that now continues. Charity
does not retreat to the blindness and bitterness that limited her
in June. Instead she reaches outward and may find a richer, more
fulfilling life than she anticipated. Her increased stature is
measured by the fact that the girl who did hate and distrust
everything has first loved unselfishly and then has embraced the
honest affection offered to her. Although Charity has not escaped
the confines of the sickly village, the point of greater signifi
cance is that she has not been wasted by the atrophy which
threatened her.

NOTES
Backward Glance (New York, 1934), pp. 293-94. In commenting on
her New England fiction, Mrs. Wharton stressed the grimness of rural
New England and questioned the account of life as viewed “through the
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rose-coloured spectacles of my predecessors, Mary Wilkins and Sarah
Orne Jewett.” She also recalled that the seminal anecdote about the
mountain settlement was given her by a rector from Lenox, the site of
her home.
"^Summer (New York, n.d.), p. 4.
^Although not overtly a feminist in her fiction, Mrs. Wharton is cer
tainly usually careful to distinguish the problems that are especially the
woman’s, and not only in The House of Mirth, which is her most ex
tended study of an American woman caught between what society ex
pects of her and what it actually offers her. Furthermore, for male
characters, even weak ones such as Royall, there is generally a
security provided by education and vocation.
"^Mrs. Wharton writes much more knowingly about sexual matters than
she has been given credit for. In The House of Mirth, The Custom of the
Country, The Age of Innocence, and The Reef — to mention four major
novels — the plot complications turn almost entirely upon reactions that
are frankly sexual.
^Summer, p. 132.
^^ummer, p. 146.
^The sinister abortionist. Dr. Merkle, is rather typical of the exag
gerated villainy that Wharton sometimes associates with women
characters, but seldom with men. To the doctor, with her false hair and
teeth and her false murderous smiles, the novelist attributes even a
hint of lesbianism by having her treat Charity in a too friendly manner
and suggest that she could stay with the doctor’s “lady friend” in
Boston.
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A DREAM
I came to a river
I could not cross.
The road slid under
the water’s edge.
A face in the water said,
“Strip off your clothes.
Everybody here knows
everybody tonight.”
The pig-nuts knocked;
the grasses sighed.
I stripped me of
my coat and vest
and naked in
the water went.
Wet with dark,
my senses cried.
But pain then
turned to shudder.
I crashed my head
against a rock.
It was my brother.
— Norman Chaney
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Michael F. Rothgery

MICHELET: ROMANTIC HISTORIAN OF JOAN OF ARC
Jules Michelet (1798-1874) is the supreme historian of the
Romantic school in France. G. P. Gooch argues that in “com
bining his passionate love for the people with a grandeur and
poetry of his own, [Michelet] stands as the greatest literary
artist who has ever devoted himself to history in France.” He,
along with other Romantics, brought to the study of French history
as a whole a new dimension freeing Clio (muse of history) from
its eighteenth century classical chains.
Michelet deepened man’s understanding of history by his
concern for the force of nationalism, his feeling for the common
people and their role in history, and his awareness of a contin
uous historical development. Furthermore, he deepened man’s
understanding of history by his extensive use of primary sources
and his imaginative and graphic style. Yet, such methods of
writing history brought many dangers which detracted from the
works of Michelet and other Romantic historians. Chauvinism, a
lack of critical sense, and a general neglect of the problem of
historical causation (i.e. analysis of forces and events leading
to a particular historical phenomenon such as economic condi
tions leading to the Revolution of 1789) were among the dangers
which arose from Michelet’s efforts to penetrate the meaning of
history.
Michelet’s major purpose was to resurrect the past. G. P.
Gooch writes that Michelet’s “. . . object was ‘the resurrection
of the life of the past as a whole,’ the land, the people, events,
institutions and beliefs.” For Michelet the historian must give
himself fully to the past. In order to achieve this object Michelet
wrote his monumental History of France. Perhaps, in his narra
tive of Joan of Arc, volume V of this work, he most nearly
achieved his goal.
In his history of Joan of Arc, Michelet was seeking to utilize
the past in order to reawaken the French to the past glory of their
country. Joan of Arc was the heroine who by her military suc
cesses and martyrdom could serve as a symbol for the revolutiontorn French nation of the nineteenth century. Joan in her own
time had arisen to eminence at a time of serious crisis in France.
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Michelet wrote
. • God himself must take command. The God of
that age was the Virgin, far more than Jesus. The Virgin was
descending upon earth in the guise of a maid from the common
folk, young, fair, gentle, and bold.” Thus, the French Romantic
historian not only captured the spirit of the Middle Ages, but also
depicted a heroine, with the characteristics of the common
people, who was divinely destined to kindle in the French people
a sense of national spirit. Joan saw her efforts rewarded when
the dauphin was crowned at Reims as Charles VII. The young
peasant girl proclaimed to the king, “Noble king, now God’s will
is fulfilled.” In this, Michelet suggested the spirit of the age
which might be interpreted by later generations as nascent
nationalism. To his own generation, Michelet raised the question
of national unity in his work Le Peuple. Realizing that France
was surrounded by enemies, he pleaded for “one people, one
country, one France.”
Michelet also contributed to man’s understanding of history by
his feeling for the common people. Michelet was living in an age
when the revolutionary upheavals had shown the power of the
masses. It was only natural for Michelet, therefore, a commoner
himself, to seek out the part such people played in France’s
history. More than anything else, he believed the common people
shaped the past. Michelet wrote in Le Peuple that one of his
central airris was “. . . to know the life of the people, their tools
and their sufferings.” Among the people he could find the “words
of common sense.” Joan of Arc, the plain, peasant girl, was the
symbol of the significance of the common people. Michelet
stresses the “eminent originality” of the maid and her “common
sense.” He delighted in telling how the maid got the better of
the learned scholars in the trials. Her reply to the judge’s
question on the state of grace “dumfounded the pharisees.”
Michelet wrote, “She cut the knot with heroic and Christian
simplicity.” The truths of the heart were raised above the truths
of the head. Joan was also symbolic of the common folk in her
willingness to sacrifice even her life. Yet, despite Michelet’s
preoccupation with the common folk, it seems apparent that the
Romantics were still infatuated with the role of a hero rather
than the people, but a hero who personified an ideal.
Another way Michelet added to an understanding of history
was his awareness of a continuous historical development.
Michelet and the Romantics were aware that the characteristics
of the present had grown from those in the past. Unlike Voltaire,
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he saw and appreciated the contributions of the Middle Ages to
the growth of France. And he perceived that Joan’s contribution
to this development was in helping implant a national conscious
ness. In other words, Michelet observed French history from a
longer perspective than the historians of the Enlightenment. He
saw that the past was unlike the present and he observed a linear
movement in history toward a dramatic climax in his own time.
For him France was a union of divergent lines of development
and regional differences. He was keenly aware of the regional
and national characteristics evident in his own generation and he
sought their origin and development in the past history of Europe.
He referred to Lorraine craftiness and bravery and Champagne
gentleness. He regarded Joan’s bravery as beyond that which a
German or Englishman would have risked.
Michelet also excelled in his use of primary sources. He had
been trained as an archivist and worked for some twenty years
among old manuscripts in the Archives Nationales. He looked
upon these primary sources as the life stories of men, of prov
inces, and of people. But Michelet exploited these sources more
than he criticized them. He utilized them in order to add color to
his narrative, rather than to seek objectively the truth behind a
given historical event. In his story of Joan, he refers to the
eyewitness account of Joan’s character by her childhood friend
Haumette. Although Michelet did not always hold up such testi
mony to careful scrutiny, it does show his awareness of the
significance of primary sources.
Michelet’s style was both imaginative and descriptive. Gooch
describes him as having a “grandeur and poetry of his own.’’
Although style may not deepen our understanding of history in
the strictest sense of the word, it does enable us to have a
greater appreciation of what happened in the past. A vivid
portrayal of an event can bring it to life for the reader. The
graphic description of Joan’s death certainly demonstrates
Michelet’s feeling for the young maid. The description of the
trial demonstrates Michelet’s sympathetic imagination in relating
the mental anguish of Joan. His style, however, suffers from at
least one fault: it is more of a tableau than a narrative. His
history lacks continuity, in spite of his evident awareness of the
linear movement of history.
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The most serious danger in Michelet’s writing was that his
sympathies led him to excesses. For example, his nationalism led
to chauvinism.He tended to deprecate those who were not French.
In particular, he hated the English. He suggested that they were
suffering from pride; and he plays upon this theme throughout his
account of Joan of Arc, placing the blame for the selfless Joan’s
death upon the English. (He was highly critical of the French
bishop Cauchon at the trial in Rouen because he had sided with
the English.) In Joan of Arc as in his other works, Michelet tends
to view the struggle of men in history as a contest between good
and evil. For him Joan is the symbol of all that is good and pure;
she is the embodiment of France who struggles to defeat the
forces of oppression.
In summary, therefore, we may say that Michelet as a Roman
tic historian lacks a certain critical spirit. Too often he identi
fied glibly with his heroes. Too often he lost sight of the actual
commonness of the common people. Too often he lost himself in
the narrative and longed for the past. He wrote, “Ah! would I
were with them, one of them, the simplest, the least among these
children.’’ In the final analysis, Michelet faced a dilemma. He
wanted to put “his faith in the future” since he viewed history
as a drama of liberty, a march to an era of democracy, but his
heart was “obstinately attached to the past.” But for all his
shortcomings as a truly objective or scientific historian, Miche
let as a writer made history live. And in reading him, even to this
day, history is made to live again in us.

Borman Chaney
the wonder of the WORLD:
A THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

“If you really examined a kernel of grain thoroughly,
you would die of wonder.”----Martin Luther

Nature may be understood in at least two contrasting ways.
The more common definition of nature is: the physical systems
apart from man and his civilization which form man’s basic,
given environment. From this view, there is a tendency to think
]ii®n as standing over against nature. The second definition is
less common But more comprehensive than the first, for' it in
cludes man and his works within its compass. From this view ^
there is a tendency to thinlT of man in nature, as an inextricable Cr*<^r<rpart of his environing world. For the sake of brevity, we may
describe the first as an excluxinri.i.<!t »mVw nf nature, and tke
second as an inclusionist view.^
In the post-New Testament era, Christianity has been pre
dominantly exclusionist in its view of nature.^ And this attitude
has caused a serious tension in the structure of Christian thought
itself. Simone Weil alludes to this tension when she asks, “How
can Christianity call itself catholic if the universe itself is left
out?”^ A main implication of this remark, as I interpret it, is
yvhu is
that v>iinoLiaiiiLy
Christianity cannot presume to spcaiv
speak of a vjaa
God who
is cuncon- cemed with the ultimate well-being of man without at the same
time speaking of a God who is concerned with the ultimate wellbeing
of everything which inhabits the earth,
earth. hdr
For just as God i8|>^
ig ol
the Creative Ground of human existence, so is he the Creative
Ground of all existence. In a word, Christianity must broaden its
conception of God’s relation to the created order. It must become
more inclusionist in its theological perspectives.
A main starting point for the broadening of these theological
perspectives, I assume, is the biblical tradition itself. Emil
Brunner has remarked that “the cosmic element in the Bible is
never anything more than the ‘scenery’ in which the history of-^
mankind takes place.’’^ But such a remark is refuted in the light
of the observations of so eminent a biblical scholar as H.
Wheeler Robinson. He writes:
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istoiy supplied a revelation of God which Nature, notwithstan ing all its rich content and variety, could never afford.
et the conception of the God who works in history is
inseparably linked to His manifestation in natural phenomena.
e is what Nature, as well as history, reveals Him to
be, and Nature is His peculiar language.^

In Robinson’s opinion, the main lines of the biblical picture
of the divine history with nature are set forth in both Testaments,
at ough most of the details of the picture come from the Old*
r»i*j
rnain lines, the New Testament is consistent with the
•
k" ri*i j
of the details concerning nature found
in the Old Testament are taken for granted by the New. This is
particu ar y true in the teachings of Jesus, where he invites us
Un a manner reminiscent of the Psalmists) to contemplate and
field and the birds of the air in their
J
in 1 erenw concerning the future and their docile acceptance of
f W'
destiny. Paul later brings this dominant Hebraic theme into . K
theologocal focus when he speaks of the apokaradokia of nature^t^
1 s s raining forward, as with outstretched neck, towards a last
rede^m£t^which mankind awaits. Paul’s language obviously^^ j"
reflecStlTi cosmology orKIiTime, but his words of hope and b
exaltation simultanegusly rfiVeaUiis understanding- of the divine /
the world, j^it is this understanding which certain
/
^ ogians in our own dajThave attempted fb recapture from their
Varying perspectives.
T

k”

niost persuasive of these thinkers is Paul Tillich,
Nature and Sacrament,”^ for example, Tillicl'
® theological interpretation of nature by which
vision of the divine essence of
r J. . "'^y cnee again come to conceive of nature as the bearer
ot divine meaning and power.
essay

that in the past at least three basic metahave been advanced which tend to
nature^ technical or quantitative understanding of
conee^t
Conception; (2) the vitalistic
of these°"tk
symbolic-romantic conception. The first
“\orn rl'
^ '’^‘^S’’^°'l'-sacramental, we find earliest in history.
ener^wk-^k
1® filled with a sort of material
bodv a fl 'tk
things and to parts of things, even to the
T'lr h'd 1 ^ P®’'*-® cf the body, a sacral power.” At bottom*
and
conception of nature is both superstitious
and utilitarian. Man attempts to control the powers of nature

■

I
.
|
<

through the performance of certain rituals or rites. The second
interpretation, the vitalistic, has dominated Western thought
since the days of Greek philosophy. “Here an immediate power
of being is attributed to things. Everything, the whole worldprocess, is envisaged as an expression of life: elan vital, ‘the
vital urge.’ ’’ Through this interpretation, Tillich maintains, the
concept of the power of nature is retained or recovered, “but it
is a power without meaning’’ from a religious perspective,
because it bears no relationship to the notion of transcendence.
The third interpretation, the symbolic-romantic, “attempts to
give back to nature its qualitative character, its depth, its
meaningfulness, by interpreting nature as a symbol of the human
spirit. The-power of things is thp power of soul or spirit imposed
upon them. But this interpretation has little awareness of “the
real structure of nature,’’ Tillich maintains, because it substi
tutes for this awareness the symbolic “creations of an arbitrary
imagination.” What is needed in our time to overcome the quanti
tative, calculable “nature” of physics, Tillich claims, is yet a
fourth interpretation, one in which “Power and physical char
acter, meaning and objective structure, are not separated in
nature.” “The power of nature,” he continues, “must be found
in a sphere prior to the cleavage of our world into subjectivity
and objectivity” (or thought and extension). And Tillich proposes
what he describes as a “realistic” interpretation of nature as a
means to this end. This interpretation is based on the notion that
nature is in and of itself sacred (or the bearer of divine meaning
and power) because nature (like man) is bound up in “the history
of salvation.” At this point, Tillich’s thought affords a corollary
to the speculations of R. G. Collingwood in The Idea of Nature.
At the end of his study of this idea from the pre-Socratics to
Whitehead, Collingwood observes that “nature, though it is a
thing that really exists, is not a thing that exists in itself or in
its own right, but a thing which depends for its existence upon
something else.”^ This something else in Collingwood’s view
is history. Both Tillich and Collingwood are elaborating the
Kantian perception that time (history) and space (nature) are the
two prime categories of thought, and that in the processes of
human thought these two categories always occur in conjunction.
Tillich, unlike Collingwood, however, is expounding the theolog
ical implications of this Kantian perception.
Tillich’s view of salvation history seems to me to be a
remarkable combination of biblical thought (especially in its
Pauline mode) and Western philosophical thought (especially in
57

its essentialist mode). The drive for combining these modes is
revealed in his language about the ultimate fulfillment of all
reality in God, Tillich describes his view as “eschatological
pan-en-theism.”® According to this view, to be “in” God means
to be received back into or reunited with a creature’s creative
origin, the source of a creature’s ontological dependence, and
the realization of a creature’s ultimate fulfillment. This process
of fulfillment may be described symbolically as the movement
from essence-to existence (fall) and from existence to essence
(salvation or “essentialization”). But as Tillich readily admits,
the prime difficulty of apprehending “the uncleft levelof reality”
in which all creatures ultimately participate (and hence are in
the here and now potential bearers of divine meaning and power)
is “the necessity to penetrate into something ‘nonsubjective’
with categories of a subjective mind and into something ‘non
objective’ with categories of objective reality.”Indeed,
Tillich declares, “the apprehension of the inherent powers of
nature is not a possible task for rational discourse. Other
methods of approach must be employed [such as myth and poetry],
and these methods are not conclusive because they permit us to
do little more than point to something the acknowledgement of
which cannot be forced.”^ ^ The principle which underlies all
these methods of apprehending the uncleft level of reality, how
ever, is for Tillich ,the principle of “faith,” which he defines as
“the state of being grasped by the transcendent unity of unam
biguous [or uncleft] life,” Faith “embodies love as the state of
being taken into that transcendent unity.And in this state,
“Any object or event is sacramental in which the transcendent is
perceived to be present.”^®
We may enlarge upon Tillich’s observations at this point by
noting that the person who experiences the sacred (or sacra
mental) in nature enters into the encounter, which means that he
is not simply a theoretical knower, but one who lives in and
through experience, who puts questions both to the world and to
himself. Not every common object, to be sure, will figure in
every possible encounter, but every such object could so figure,
depending upon the particular circumstances. In any encounter,
the sacred and the profane stand in polar relation to each other.
In one sense they are antithetic because what is sacred stands
over against the profane and cannot be dissolved into it; and yet
the two must not be interpreted so that all relations between
them are severed. It belongs to the character of the sacred to
make its appearance in and through the profane, and it belongs
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to the character of the profane to be sustained and illuminated by
the sacred. The sacred, however, is the standard for judging the
profane since the sacred provides man with a vision of what life
should be, and thus reveals the extent to which mundane exist
ence falls short of its ideal or “transcendent unity.” An en
counter with the sacred is therefore an occasion upon which
man s capacity as a religious creature may be realized, for in
this encounter he is driven beyond himself to ponder existence
as having a Ground and final purpose. For Tillich, we may say
in summary of his position, man’s encounter with the sacred
leads inevitably to what another theologian, Sam Keen, has
described as “ontologic wonder,”^'* or to an experience of the
World as necessitating a sufficient source beyond itself (the God
who is the creator and sustainer of all being). But as Keen goes
on to observe, in defense of a much less metaphysical position
than Tillich’s, “A world created by God is no less miraculous or
Wonderful than one that merely happens by chance.”^ ^ And he
maintains that there are some experiences of encounter with the
sacred in which man feels no particular need to ponder existence
as having a Ground and final purpose. Instead, he is content to
respect, relish, and celebrate the object of his perception in its
contingent otherness, in which it displays itself without bearing
Us own explanation. Keen describes this as “theophanic”
Wonder.And it is this mode of wonder which seems to me to be
the basic inspiration of the thought of the American theologian,
Conrad Bonifazi.
Following the thought of Edmund Husserl, Bonifazi maintains
that as we experience things (or phenomena), we impose upon
them their whatness or essence. We give things significance in
our human world, in other words, by relating them to ourselves.
Such a theory rests on the notion that things are not simply there
in their spread-out-ness. They are also within us, and they form
the contents of our consciousness. By consciousness, however,
Bonifazi means more than a mirror held up to the world to reflect
It. Consciousness in his framework of thought points to things: it
is intentionally related to them. The distinction between things
vaguely apprehended and those upon which attention is focused
makes possible the difference between mere awareness and
actual experiencing. The intentional, creative glance permits us
to receive the meaning of things, and in this sense we may say
that we constitute the things before us. It is the perceiver’s
intentional glance towards things which gives them, not exist
ence, but essence. It bestows upon them depth and meaning and
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validity within the human world.
It has been objected that in this scheme of thought, the
natural world has no sacred meaning in itself except as the
perceiver imposes that meaning upon it.^® But a more precise
interpretation of Bonifazi’s attitude, I believe, is that the world
has this meaning only insofar as man construes that meaning for
himself, who is, after all, the only consciously religious creature
on earth. (Bonifazi, as opposed to Tillich, is much more an
existentialist than an essentialist thinker.)
But what quality of meaning, Bonifazi asks, is the contem
porary religious man to impose upon things in his own inner
world, especially in view of the fact that over the Christian
centuries man has been content to divorce himself “emotionally
from nature in the name of the transcendent God and on behalf of
his own immortal soul”?^^ Bonifazi offers Kierkegaard’s “knight
of faith” as an adequate image of the modern religious man’s
proper response to the world of nature. After quoting Kierke
gaard’s description of the “knight,” as it appears in Fear and
Trembling,Bonifazi adds;
The “knight” is ... a man for whom the things of this
world^ are really interesting in themselves, in whose mind
the
truth of things” is not engulfed and lost in some
higher reference, and whose search for an elsewhere hqs
led to the discovery that elsewhere is essentially here.^^

The knight of faith,” according to Bonifazi’s interpretation of
Kierkegaard, is one who has embraced theophanic wonder as a
mode of being-in-the-world. He is one who is willing to forego
theological speculation about the Ground and purpose of things,
and to assume instead, in the spontaneity of the moment, an
attitude of surprise and delight in the sheer giveness of things.
In so doing, perhaps even unbeknownst to the knight himself, he
fulfills the biblical injunction to “praise the Lord,” who has
“made so many things” (Ps. 104).
It is therefore within two poles of thought that we may find
development of a religious vision that is fundamental to our time.
The first of these poles is represented by a basically essential
ist thinker, Paul Tillich, who is an exponent of ontologic wonder:
the second of these poles is represented by a basically existen
tialist thinker,Conrad Bonifazi, who is an exponent of theophanic
wonder. The import of this vision, 1 submit, is that it causes us
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to reflect upon a theme which stands at the very heart of the
biblical witness. If we are to know God, we must not, we cannot,
leave this earth. It is his home and dwelling-space, and every
detail in it — for he who has the eyes to see — conveys the
wonder of his presence.

^Cf. Frederick Elder, Crisis in Eden: A Religious Study of Man and
Enyironmenl (New York: Abingdon Press, 1970).
^Allan D. Galloway, in The Cosmic Christ (London: Nisbet and

Company, 1951), points out that the biblical writers themselves,
especially the writers of the apocalyptic books, were intensely inclusionist in their view of nature. The bright strand of cosmic redemption
drawn through biblical literature not only indicates an affinity and
destiny common to man and things, but also attributes to matter as to
man a function within the salvation structures it describes. Among the
theologians of the early centuries of the church, only Driven attempted
to develop this theme with care. But his doctrine of the ‘restitution of
all things,” the apokatastasis panton, was generally rejected as under
cutting the seriousness of religious and ethical decisions.
^Waiting for God, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Capricorn Books,
1959), p. 161.
'"Reason and Revelation, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: West
minster Press, 1946), p. 33n.
In light of Brunnen’s defense of natural theology, this quotation from
Revelation and Reason may appear as an anomaly in the context of his
work. It was Brunner, after all, who is his famous disputation with Karl
Barth in the 1930’s, maintained that God reveals himself not solely in
Jesus Christ as known in the Scriptures, but also in creation and in on
going history. (Barth’s response to Brunner’s position — as detailed in
Natural Theology — was a work entitled''/Vo/”) In the final analysis,
however, Brunner’s position is similar to Barth’s. For while insisting
that all men have the power, even apart from Jesus Christ as known in
the Scriptures, to attain to some knowledge of God, Brunner yet de
clares that this knowledge is not of the least saving value. For an
astute comparison and contrast of the Barth-Brunner positions, see
John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1959), pp. 17-34.
^Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1946), p. 8.
°The Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adams (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 94-112. Quotations from Til
lich’s essay are from these pages without specific reference to number
unless in the opinion of the author such reference is necessary.
J-The Idea of Mature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967L p- 176.
“Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill (London: Nisbet and Company, 1964)
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^ Nature and Sacrament,” The Protestant Era, p. 102.
tbhid., p. 103.
Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, 137,
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Nature and Sacrament, The Protestant Era, p. 108.
^Apology for Wonder (New York; Harper and Row Publishers, 1969),

p. 36.
z^lbid.. D. 37.
\pbid., p. 36.
‘A Theology of Things (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott Company,

1967), pp. 85-9 0.
^"Daniel Day Williams, in a critique of Bonifazi’s position — Chris
tians and the Good Earth (Alexandria, Virginia; The Faith-Man-Nature

Group Press, n.d.), pp. 71-75 — says that even though Bonifazi attempts
to get beyond an anthropomorphic interpretation of nature, his episte
mology will not allow him to do so. Here Williams is pointing to a
problem which is pivotal for the theology of nature. Does nature have a
value and a significance and a raison d’etre which is at least in part
independent of the value and significance and raison d’etre of man?
Does nature have its own integrity, or does it have integrity only through
its relationship to man? In spite of the efforts of certain thinkers (such
as Williams and the later Heidegger) to indicate that nature does have
its own integrity apart from man, it seems to me that the question is in
the final analysis unanswerable, If nature did have such integrity apart
from man, man could never be aware of it. The proper focus of the
question is what integrity nature has in relation to man, and that is the
focus with which Bonifazi is concerned.
..A Theology of Things, p. 158.
'^Kierkegaard’s description, as quoted by Bonifazi, is as follows;
“The knight of faith . . . belongs entirely to the world ... He takes
delight in everything, and whenever one sees him taking part in a parti
cular pleasure, he does it with the persistence which is the mark of the
earthly man whose soul is absorbed in such things . . . He takes de
light in everything he sees, in the human swarm, in the new omnibuses,
in the waters of the Sound; ... he is interested in everything that goes
on-jin a rat which slips under the curb, in the children’s play” (p. 25).

^^Ibid.
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